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Abstract
A standard heterogeneous agent, two-asset life-cycle model is developed, which includes
entrepreneurship and a dual role for housing assets. Housing assets serve both as collateral
for loans and as a good that generates a service flow. The life-cycle model allows me to
replicate the pattern of wealth holdings that is estimated from a partially linear regression,
based on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Results suggest that, regardless
of occupation, young households hold relatively less financial wealth and most of their
wealth is in the form of housing assets. The levels and trends of financial and housing asset
holdings are quite different between wage earner households and business (entrepreneur)
households. In the median wage earner household, the age profile of housing stock is
hump-shaped, but it exhibits a flattening out pattern in the second half of lifetime. The
holding of net financial assets has an S-shaped age profile. In comparison, regardless of
whether the asset type is housing or net financial assets (which include business equity),
the asset holding of the median business household grows steadily over the life cycle.
A calibrated version of the life-cycle model is developed and used to simulate counter-
factual tax policies. These simulations are used to determine if a revenue-neutral introduc-
tion of wealth taxes brings about welfare gains (losses) in the U.S. economy. Quantitative
inspection of the model performance suggests that a life-cycle model with collateral-based
borrowing and entrepreneurship is more successful in capturing the age profile of wealth
ii
holdings as well as the fat-tailed distribution of wealth observed in the U.S. data. The quan-
titative analysis shows that a wealth tax policy reform decreases the aggregate capital stock.
This causes a rise in the interest rate, but a decline of the wage rate. Young households are
worse off because the decrease of labor income slows their accumulation of wealth, par-
ticularly in the form of housing assets. Old households also incur losses in social welfare
because the first-order effect of a wealth tax reform is to increase their tax payments and
reduce their consumption. With respect to aggregate output, these results suggest that a
proportional (flat-rate) capital income tax policy is superior to a progressive wealth tax pol-
icy (which has been proposed by Piketty). Changes in the Gini index of the pre-tax income
or post-tax wealth distributions indicate that a progressive wealth tax accomplishes a more
equal distribution of income and wealth than the proportional capital income tax. I con-
clude that, from a political economy perspective where people vote according to their gains
(losses) of social welfare, a progressive wealth tax is not likely to be favored by a majority
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The distributions of income and wealth in most countries for which there is reliable data
are skewed to the right, with thick upper tails showing large and slowly declining top in-
come and wealth shares. According to the estimates in Saez and Zucman (2016) for the
United States, the share of total wealth held by the top 1% was around 25% in 1980 and
has increased to exceed 40% today; for the top 0.1% it even doubled from less than 10%
to over 20% during the same period of time. These statistics essentially reflect economic
inequality, which is in tandem with wealth concentration, and have drawn strong atten-
tion in academic, policy and media circles. Recent bestselling books reflect attempts to
assess the causes and consequences behind inequality, and contrive a remedy for it. Stiglitz
(2015) argues that much of the inequality has been the result of rent-seeking by, for exam-
ple, winning preferential tax treatment or government-protected market share, because, to
a large extent, rent seeking redistributes money from those at the bottom to those at the top
with economic power to insulate themselves from competitive forces, and that economic
1
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inequality leads to democratic instability. Piketty (2014) and Atkinson (2015) suggest pro-
gressive tax schemes with higher taxes on the wealthiest to supplement the re-distributional
effects of the income tax.
This work investigates the macro effects of wealth taxation at the quantitative level by
conducting counterfactual policy experiments with a calibrated model built under a stan-
dard heterogeneous agents life-cycle framework, pioneered by Huggett (1996). A contribu-
tion is to accounts for two features unconventionally appearing together in a discrete-time
life-cycle economy—the role of entrepreneurship and the function of home equity-based
borrowing—for describing life-cycle savings behavior of business households as well as
distributional and welfare impacts of wealth taxes in the economy. The main result of this
work is that capital income taxes are not necessarily outperformed with respect to welfare
effect by a progressive wealth tax.
Households reporting self employment as their major source of income or own a busi-
ness with an active role in management constitute a unique group in the population and con-
tribute to the economy in a disproportionate and significant way. Despite making up only a
small fraction of the population (roughly 11% of the total), business households hold a sub-
stantial share of household wealth (40%) in the United States.1 Empirical evidence shows
that even after controlling for income, the net worth of business owners is much higher
than for other households, suggesting saving behavior differential between entrepreneurs
and workers.2 The concentration of household wealth implies that entrepreneurial saving
1Díaz-Giménez, Glover, and Ríos-Rull (2011) document that the self-employed make up 10.5 percent of
the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) sample. Gentry and Hubbard (2004) report that entrepreneurs
own 40.8% of total assets among active business owners. Quadrini (2000) reports the share of entrepreneurs
in the U.S. at 12% using the average of family data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the
period of 1970-1992 and from the SCF data for 1989-1992; they own 40% of the total wealth.
2Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) find that higher-lifetime income households save a larger fraction
of their income. Gentry and Hubbard (2004) report wealth-income ratios being higher for entrepreneurial
households and saving-income ratios being higher for entrants and continuing entrepreneurs, even after con-
trolling for age and other demographic variables. Quadrini (1999) finds the ratio of wealth to income is about
twice as large for business families as worker families.
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decisions may have important implications for models of wealth distribution or aggregate
household consumption and saving.
Previous work has found nascent entrepreneurs save for the purpose of relaxing the
credit constraints on business entry and for anticipated business investment needs.3 Ac-
cording to the prediction of intertemporal models of consumption and saving behavior
under risk and borrowing constraints, individuals hold assets to insure themselves from
unexpected income realizations—a behavior which is referred to as consumption smooth-
ing/precautionary saving.4 Given that entrepreneurs face extra income uncertainty arising
from business risk taking—relative to wage earners, who are primarily exposed to labor
income risk—entrepreneurs may have exclusive needs to buffer themselves from idiosyn-
cratic business income draws and hence accumulate more wealth than others with incen-
tives beyond usual precautionary motives.5
Some papers have documented that the wealth of entrepreneurs tends to be narrowly
sourced, which is suggestive of limits in their accessibility to external funding due to fi-
nancial friction.6 In the theoretical literature, the credit constraints (or more generally the
high cost of external finance), the minimum capital requirement for business entry, unin-
surable business risk taking rewarded by higher expected investment returns are features
3Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) shows that credit constraints at the house-
hold level matter for the creation of new business, although some authors have argued that the relationship
of wealth with business entry is present only at the very top of wealth distribution; see Hurst and Lusardi
(2004). With more advanced technique of econometric analysis, recent literature justifies the existence of the
relationship; see Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012) and Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar (2017).
4See Carroll (1997), Deaton (1991), and Modigliani (1986).
5Hurst et al. (2010) use subgroup data from PSID to show, when controlling for business ownership, the
size of precautionary savings with respect to labor income risk is modest and accounts for less than 10% of
total household wealth. The result suggests that a huge share of entrepreneurial wealth could not be explained
by precautionary motives.
6See Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and Quadrini (1999) for empirical evidence based on the U.S. data.
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characterizing the environment of entrepreneurs. In the literature of entrepreneurial mod-
els, these elements constitute the mechanism to drive households to save more and shape
the concentration of the wealth distribution in a model economy.
1.1 Problem statement
To compare different policy consequences, I need a framework that accounts for drivers
of the wealth distribution over households where account is taken of their heterogeneity in
age, labor efficiency, entrepreneurial ability, asset holdings and luck in running a business.
Models based on earnings shock and precautionary savings alone tend not to replicate the
observed features of wealth distribution with the thick upper tail, featuring a large and slow
decreasing top wealth shares.7
Recent theoretical literature has shown that, under substantially weak assumptions on
consumption function and random processes of earnings and returns, stochastic asset re-
turns is one plausible candidate to help reproduce the fat upper tail of the wealth distribution
in a calibrated model.8 Some authors have found that compensation to entrepreneurs, i.e.,
risky entrepreneurial rent, is a feasible proxy for stochastic returns on investment, which
is deemed as one potential extension for generating a fat-tailed wealth distribution, as ob-
served in the data.9 In the heterogeneous agents literature, models which exploit the role
of entrepreneurial function to reproduce the wealth concentration are mostly built under
7De Nardi, Fella, and Pardo (2016) show that earnings data fro non-entrepreneurs do not feature sufficient
downward risk to generate a thick upper-tail in the wealth distribution as a result of precautionary saving.
8Benhabib and Bisin (2016) survey theoretical literature and identify three basic mechanisms that can
contribute to generate wealth distributions that have thick upper thick tails: skewed earnings, stochastic
returns on wealth, and explosive wealth accumulation. Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) note that business
ownership and increasing asset returns and capital gains are promising features underlying the generation of
wealth concentration observed in the U.S. data. Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2016) suggest introducing more
heterogeneity in preferences, in the wage/earnings process, or in occupation in order to match the data better.
9Modeling stochastic wealth returns in the form of business returns is one of extensions for replicating
the highly skewed wealth distribution; see Benhabib and Bisin (2016) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2008).
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an infinitely-lived agents framework. However, little of existing research has explicitly
used life-cycle patterns and heterogeneity in household asset holdings to enrich our under-
standing about the primary determinants of these household choices over the lifetime. The
challenge is whether the same interpretation for the cross-sectional variation of household
saving behaviors can be extended to the life-cycle dimension (where age is the additional
state variable) remains unaddressed.
It is known that a major fraction of total wealth for most households is in the form of
housing—which is a relatively illiquid and indivisible type of investment, with unique risk
and tax characteristics, as compared to financial wealth such as money, bonds, and sav-
ings accounts. The empirical literature has found that household wealth holdings are very
heterogeneous by age, income and occupation.10 In a life-cycle setting, the literature has
shown that the fraction of risky assets in the asset portfolio should decrease with age as peo-
ple move closer to retirement.11 When analyzing the effects of taxation, macroeconomics
typically assumes a single riskless asset, or at most two, for example, when entrepreneurial
investment (business capital) is included.12 This allows a considerable simplification, at the
potential cost of ignoring the policy implications of household heterogeneity across asset
categories and age groups with respect to asset holdings.
Entrepreneurship has been introduced in the study of the distributional effects of a va-
riety of taxation.13 In this branch of the literature, most of the entrepreneurial/occupational
10See Banks, Blundell, and Smith (2003); Heaton and Lucas (2000); Yang (2009).
11See Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007); Bloom, Canning, and Graham (2003); Campbell
and Viceira (2002); Jappelli and Modigliani (1998)
12For example, one of the early optimal capital taxation papers by Chamley (1986) considers only a
riskless security. In the same line of literature, the overlapping generations model proposed by Conesa, Kitao,
and Krueger (2009) uses a riskless asset as well but reaches a conclusion different from that of Chamley
(1986). A growing literature of wealth distribution and taxation uses a occupational choice framework that
accounts for business capital, whose rate of returns is by construction not riskless; See Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006); Kitao (2008); Ocampo et al. (2017).
13In the entrepreneurial literature, Cagetti and De Nardi (2009) focuses on estate taxation; Chen, Qi, and
Schlagenhauf (2017) on corporate income tax; Kitao (2008) on taxes imposed on different income sources;
Meh (2005) on a progressive income tax system; Ocampo et al. (2017) on wealth taxation.
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choices models abstract from the function of home equity as collateral in debt obligations.
In reality, collateral borrowing is an important means for households to overcome credit
constraints. Indeed, recent papers, using a probit regression model with suitable instru-
mental variables to deal with endogeneity, have found that the value of home equity is
positively related to entrepreneurial entry.14 To the extent that housing is a collateraliz-
able asset and a partial substitute for a liquid asset, it is highly probable that household
responsiveness to policy differs significantly across housing and nonhousing assets. In this
case, removing the role of housing assets from the model environment would undermine
the reliability of model prediction in the study of policy and welfare.
With the absence of housing assets, a policy analysis of wealth taxation of this kind
fails to recognize the negative impact on welfare because housing asset holdings would
otherwise not be taxable. Consider an extreme one-period case of a tax reform in an island
economy. On the island live two brothers, Henry and Frank. The brothers are endowed
with the same amount of capital worth $2000. Henry holds 100% of his wealth in the
form of housing asset. On the contrary, Frank saves 100% of his wealth in savings account.
Suppose that a flat-rate capital income tax is implemented at the rate of 20% and the interest
rate of a saving account is 10%. The tax revenue collected by the government under the
flat-rate capital income tax scheme totals $40 (2000*10%*20%), paid entirely by Frank.
Suppose that a revenue-neutral proportional wealth tax is introduced in place
of the flat-rate capital income tax. The required rate of the wealth tax is 0.95%
(40/(2000+2000(1+10%))). Frank’s post-reform tax payment drops by 48% from $40
to $21 (≈2000*(1+10%)*0.95%). In comparison, Henry’s post-reform tax payment surges
from nil to $19 (≈2000*0.95%), or his tax burden measured by the ratio of taxes to wealth
14Some empirical papers, based on different sources of data, show that housing asset holding is a de-
terminant for the business creation; see Corradin and Popov (2015), Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012), Jensen,
Leth-Petersen, and Nanda (2014), and Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar (2017).
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increases from zero to 0.0095 (≈19/2000). In a more realistic scenario where there exists
wealth inequality in this island economy and Henry represents the low-wealth household
with the capital endowment worth $100. In this case, Henry’s post-reform tax burden al-
most doubles (0.0174≈40/(100+2000(1+10%))). To sum up, the impact of wealth taxation
at the household level is determined by the composition of the household asset portfolio
and thus varies across households. For those low-wealth households, it is highly probable
that they would hold less housing stock in response to the implementation of the flat-rate
tax reform in order to shelter themselves from paying more tax payment because of the
first-order effect of the flat-rate wealth taxation.
Motivated by the problems mentioned above, I examine three central questions in this
work: (1) Are the life-cycle saving behaviors of entrepreneurial households and wage
earner households different? (2) Can life-cycle patterns of wealth holdings in business
households be produced by a life-cycle occupational choice (entrepreneurial) model? (3)
Is wealth taxation (i.e., taxing the stock of household capital) a preferred tax policy when
compared to capital income taxation (i.e., taxing the income inflow from capital)?
1.2 Research objectives
I answer these questions with a two pronged approach: a semi-parametric regression model
and a general equilibrium model where household occupations are determined endoge-
nously and home equity can be used as security for loans. The first question is positive in
nature. My first objective is to characterize the life-cycle patterns of the median business
household’s wealth holdings with a partially linear regression model. It is a hybrid of a
linear regression model with a kernel smoothing model (the former is parametric, while the
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latter is not). The raw data for the analysis comes from the SCF during the period 1986-
2013. One technical challenge is that the demographic attribute, age, is a default state
variable in a life-cycle analysis. However, the SCF is a cross-sectional household survey
data, which is by no mean suitable for panel analysis because the SCF survey respondents
are, by construction, not sampled repeatedly over time.
Following Deaton (1995), I bypass this problem by compiling the raw data into a pseudo
panel data set such that only the summary statistics of the median households in groups of
age are computed. With the resulting data set, a nonlinear regression analysis is conducted
that regresses the dependent variables of interest on dummies for survey years, ages and
cohorts. The dependent variables include the levels of the median household’s housing
asset holding and financial wealth holding. Based on the estimated partially linear regres-
sion model, I capture the levels and trends of the housing and nonhousing asset holdings
over the life cycle of the median business household. Another function of the estimated
life-cycle patterns is to be used in the subsequent analysis for graphical inspection to check
whether or not the calibrated version of the proposed life-cycle model reasonably replicates
the estimated age profile of household wealth holdings.
To answer the second central question, I propose a model on the basis of Huggett’s
(1996) life-cycle model.15 I extend his model by adding two additional features: the role of
entrepreneurs and the dual function of housing as a collateralizable asset and a good pro-
viding service flow. The formulation of entrepreneurship is akin to the modeling strategy
of Quadrini (2000), where individuals make occupational choices subject to idiosyncratic
uncertainty in entrepreneurial ability and labor productivity. The mechanism of borrowing
15The life-cycle model proposed in this work inherits a set of variations of the features from the hetero-
geneous agents life-cycle framework proposed by Huggett (1996). They include (1) income, earnings, and
longevity uncertainty, (2) institutional features such as social security and taxation, and (4) market features
such as borrowing constraints and the absence of insurance markets.
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against the housing asset is embedded into the household borrowing constraint (see Cocco
(2005) and Silos (2007) for similar model setup).
There are two types of households in the model. The number of each type is deter-
mined endogenously. At any point of time, households are heterogeneous in age, the size
of financial wealth and housing asset, and occupation. Worker households (similar to con-
sumers in the standard representative agent economy with production) exchange labor effi-
ciency endowment for wages, while business households are responsible for servicing their
business loans and making decisions on hiring factors of production. The entrepreneurial
households engage in a risky project with a production technology exhibiting decreasing
returns to scale and earn idiosyncratic returns on business investment under uncertainty.
The stochastic mechanism behind this setup is defined by an exogenous Markov process.
In addition, there also exists a corporate (non-entrepreneurial) sector that offers non-
stochastic returns and features anonymous business decision making. Households with
entrepreneurial talent save for and invest in business projects that entail a minimum capital
requirement. Constrained households may choose costly external loans with own hous-
ing asset as collateral. Households without entrepreneurial talent allocate their savings
to risk-free assets for smoothing consumption and for future business opportunity. Thus,
this model describes an economy wherein a fraction of the households choose to become
entrepreneurs while the others live on wages and returns from savings in the form of risk-
less financial assets as their main income source until they have sufficient capital and en-
trepreneurial talent to transit from wage-and-salary to self-employment.
To answer the second central question, my research objective is to determine if a
calibrated heterogeneous agents model of home equity-based borrowing by liquidity-
constrained households with extra heterogeneity in occupation can account for the differen-
tials in the empirical life-cycle patterns of asset holdings between business and nonbusiness
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households. In other words, the same theory in characterizing the role of entrepreneurship
in the infinitely-lived framework, can be shown to be sufficient to produce the heterogene-
ity in age profiles of wealth holdings that looks similar to their empirical counterparts in
the data.
The third question is normative in nature. To complement the discussion revolving
around Piketty’s (2014) wealth tax policy, I evaluate the welfare impact of the basic ver-
sion of his proposal by examining how a wealth tax impacts the economy as opposed to a
tax on capital income. I exploit the calibrated version of the baseline model as the vehicle
for policy experiments. My third research objective is to determine if a change from a sin-
gle proportional capital income tax to a mixture of capital income tax and a Piketty-type
(2014) progressive wealth tax scheme brings about any significant welfare losses or gains.
I measure the transfer of taxation burden, and characterize how it is distributed across the
population using a general equilibrium model that can explicitly study firm dynamics (en-
trepreneurial entry and investment), aggregate variables, factor prices, and asset portfolio
choices across occupational and age groups of household.
To accomplish the research objectives, I perform several policy experiments to evaluate
the effects of introducing capital taxes under three scenarios. In the calibrated model of the
U.S. economy, the default tax scheme (denoted by T0) is a nonlinear function of household
earnings as formulated in Gouveia and Strauss (1994).16 Taxable household earnings in
this economy can be divided into three categories: household incomes (wages, interests
earned from savings, and business profits), government transfer (social security benefits),
and intergenerational transfers (accidental bequests). In the first policy experiment P1, I
conduct a tax reform from the initial tax scheme T1 to the alternative tax scheme T2. The
16Based on individual tax return data collected by the Internal Revenue Service, Gouveia and Strauss
(1994) estimate a parameterized nonlinear function of individual total taxable income to approximate the
progressivity of the U.S. federal income tax system.
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initial tax scheme T1 is defined as a hybrid of the default nonlinear tax scheme with a
proportional tax rate on capital income from savings set at 15%.17 Since the capital income
from savings is taxed individually, to avoid double taxing capital income from the same
source, the tax base of the nonlinear taxation part in T1 only considers wage and business
profits for the household incomes category—i.e., the nonlinear tax is not levied on interest
earned from savings in T1.
















Figure 1.1: Illustration of tax policy reforms.
In Figure 1.1, I illustrate by symbols the intended tax reforms, corresponding tax
schemes and economies in policy experiments P1 and P2, respectively. The initial tax
scheme in both of the policy experiments is T1. The alternative tax scheme to which a tax
policy is changed is T2 in policy experiment P1 and T3 in policy experiment P2.
The alternative tax scheme T2 of policy experiment P1 repeals the capital income tax
considered in the initial economy E1, counting accrued interest from savings toward house-
hold taxable earnings, and further introducing a flat rate of tax on household wealth. Wealth
17In the literature, the rates of capital income taxes commonly range from 10% to 40% in policy experi-
ments. I choose 15% for convenience. A full inspection over a wider interval is left for future research.
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is defined as net worth, which equals to the total of financial assets, housing asset, and busi-
ness equity net of the value of debts. The flat wealth tax rate is pinned down endogenously
by balancing the government budget in the stationary equilibrium.
In the second experiment P2, the tax policy is changed from the initial tax scheme T1
to the alternative tax scheme T3, which is a mixture of a flat-rate capital income tax with
a progressive wealth tax that targets high-wealth households. Exemption levels are set for
less wealthy households.
It is worth noting that each tax reform is revenue neutral in the sense that government
revenues are assumed to remain the same in each tax policy experiment as in the stationary
equilibrium of the baseline economy E1 (that implements the tax scheme T1).18 Some
authors in the literature choose to set the government spending to a fixed fraction of total
output across different policies, but it is not the case in this study. Besides, to make all the
policy experiments comparable with one another, the stationary-equilibrium features of the
economy E1 is used as the benchmark to evaluate the distributional effects and the welfare
costs and benefits under the other tax scenarios.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is related
to this study. In Chapter 3, I describe some stylized facts about the U.S. wealth distribution
and the age profiles of housing and financial asset holdings for the U.S. worker and business
households. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative framework for capturing the empirical life-
cycle patterns of household asset holdings and fat-upper-tailed wealth distribution in the
18The government spending in the stationary equilibrium of the baseline economy E1 is assumed to be a
fraction of total output plus interest expense on the debt outstanding. The debt outstanding is a fraction of
total capital. Both of the fractions are exogenously given and same as in the literature.
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U.S. Further, in Chapter 5, counterfactual tax policy experiments to quantitatively evaluate
two variations of wealth-based taxation are discussed. Chapter 6 concludes the study.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first work that evaluates wealth taxation by
using a quantitative, general equilibrium, life-cycle model that takes into account occupa-
tional heterogeneity with an entrepreneurial sector and the dual role of housing acting as a
good generating service flow and as collateral for loans. The model matches a number of
important macro aggregates such as the fraction and total assets of business households, and
most important of all, produces the life-cycle pattern of the median business household’s
wealth holdings that graphically fits their empirical counterparts.
This study is associated with existing work along different lines of the literature. The
first one is the applied literature concerned with the dynamic impact of capital taxation
when idiosyncratic shocks exist, financial markets are incomplete, tax instruments are re-
stricted, and/or individuals are finitely lived. A number of studies found that it may be de-
sirable to tax capital income and that the rate can be positive and large (see Aiyagari (1995),
İmrohoroğlu (1998), Erosa and Gervais (2002), Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), Kitao
(2008), and Ocampo et al. (2017)). The most related works are Kitao (2008) and Ocampo
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et al. (2017). The main difference between my analysis of theirs is the presence of hous-
ing asset in a life cycle framework with entrepreneurial talent and stochastic idiosyncratic
returns on business investment. I show that incorporating housing asset into the analysis of
wealth taxation alters some key conclusions (e.g., all else being equal, it become desirable
to consider progressive wealth taxation, when housing asset is subsumed under total as-
sets of households). Kitao (2008) studies important channels through which fiscal policies
affect aggregate variables. With an infinitely-lived agents model, her policy experiments in-
clude the description of transition path between steady states, a feature which is abstracted
from in my model due to extra computational workload incurred under a life cycle frame-
work. Ocampo et al. (2017) investigate the equality and efficiency trade-offs of a flat wealth
tax scheme. They find that a revenue-neutral tax reform replacing a capital income tax with
a wealth tax increases welfare. The main feature that differentiates their model from mine
is the setup of occupational decision-making. Ocampo et al. (2017) calibrate a stochastic
process that assigns random shocks to business productivity at the firm/household level.
Households who receive a positive business shock become entrepreneurs; otherwise, they
are workers. Conversely, occupational status is determined not directly by luck in my
model. Households make occupational choices by weighing the expected benefits of being
a worker and being an entrepreneur after observing the realization of the stochastic endow-
ments of labor efficiency and entrepreneurial ability. Further, my model allows business
households to exit entrepreneurship upon receiving a bad business income draws. By do-
ing so, my model induces more household heterogeneity, a feature which is supposed to
make optimal household savings path more diverse over the life cycle.
Besides the literature in dynamic fiscal policies, this study is related to a large literature
that studies the quantitative implications of models of occupational choice and borrowing
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constraints on wealth distribution and social mobility. The most related work are discrete-
time entrepreneurial models studied by Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Quadrini (2000).
These authors have shown that models accounting for entrepreneurship and borrowing con-
straints are important for explaining the wealth concentration in the upper tail of the em-
pirical wealth distribution. Buera and Kaboski (2014), Cagetti and De Nardi (2009), Kitao
(2008), and Meh (2005) quantify the effect of various tax and transfer policies in models
embedded with entrepreneurs and credit constraints. Buera (2009) theoretically character-
izes savings behavior by a continuous time analogy with this class of models; Vereshchag-
ina and Hopenhayn (2009) study the discrete time version. My work contributes to this
literature by providing the justification of the introduction of entrepreneurial function into
life-cycle models for the purpose of replicating the fat tail properties of wealth distributions
as well as the life cycle patterns of entrepreneurial wealth holdings.
The third literature this study is related to is the one that documents empirical life-cycle
consumption expenditure and savings profiles. The methodology employed in this branch
of literature is synthetic cohort techniques and partially linear regression analysis based
on household-level survey data; see Carroll (1997), Deaton (1997), Deaton and Paxson
(1994), De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009), Wunder et al. (2011), Wolff (2016). Among
many others, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
to construct age-profiles of consumption and income of typical households across educa-
tion and occupation groups. They find that consumption and income are both significantly
hump-shaped and consumption tracks income only early in life. Fernández-Villaverde and
Krueger (2007) use data from the 1980-2001 CEX to estimate age-expenditure profiles for
nondurable goods and consumer durables, and find significant humps over the life cycle for
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expenditures of both the goods. Based on the SCF and CEX, Yang (2009) investigates pat-
terns of consumption for housing and non-housing goods over the life cycle. She finds sim-
ilar hump-shaped consumption expenditure on non-housing goods to Fernández-Villaverde
and Krueger (2007), displaying a trend that starts low early in life, rises considerably into
middle age, and falls at a later stage of life. In contrast, she finds that household hold-
ings of housing stock stop increasing around middle age and exhibit a flattened out pattern
throughout the second half of life cycle. My work contributes to this line of literature by
looking deeper into the subgroups of the populations (i.e., workers and entrepreneurs), and
estimating the age profiles of housing and nonhousing assets across these two occupational
groups. In contrast to the conventional notion about the hump-shaped life cycle patterns
of household consumption and savings, I find that the age profiles of asset holdings, ei-
ther housing asset or financial wealth (including business equity), increase monotonically
throughout the lifetime of the median business households.
Lastly, my model is part of an expanding literature that analyzes the aggregate behavior
of economies with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. Following the tradition
of one-sector models with infinitely lived agents, however, these studies have mostly ab-
stracted from housing altogether by treating housing as part of total capital stock, and limit
their focus to interpret the cross-sectional features of data when age heterogeneity is not
desirable. Some exceptions are discussed below.1
Silos (2007) examines the relationship between macroeconomic shock and household
portfolio choices by adopting a standard overlapping generations (OLG) economy with
two assets, where uncertain productivities at the aggregate and individual levels are both
considered. His focus is on the impact of aggregate shocks on the wealth distribution and
portfolio composition. Unlike Silos (2007), I concentrate on how idiosyncratic business
1See Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009), Chen (2010), Cooper (2013), Davis and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2015) for more applications.
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shock and entrepreneurial ability are translated into the formation of wealth concentration
through household asset portfolio decisions, particularly those of business households. Ia-
coviello and Pavan (2013) and Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) use an
OLG framework with housing that considers the interaction between borrowing constraints
and aggregate economic activity to address a set of different issues. One major differ-
ence in model setting between theirs and mine is the mechanism for generating wealth
concentration. Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) exploit a heterogeneous-agent setting with
preference heterogeneity. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) induce the
skewed wealth distribution by adopting a dichotomous classification of households accord-
ing to bequest motives. On the contrary, my model assumes an identical household utility
function and a unique discount factor across households. The dichotomy in my model is
not determined by bequest preferences exogenously given, but by the fraction of business
households pinned down in the stationary equilibrium endogenously. In this study, the het-
erogeneity in the rate of returns on business investment is the driver for reproducing the
highly skewed wealth distribution, rather than the composite effect of the heterogeneity in
preference or labor efficiency.
Chapter 3
Life-Cycle Profile of Asset Holdings
This section aims to draw a contrast in saving behaviors between business and non-business
households. Some of the results are used as the benchmark for the graphical evaluation of
the proposed model in capturing the features of U.S. household wealth holdings. Between
the two occupational subgroups of households, of special interest is to evaluate the life-
cycle pattern of housing and financial asset holdings on the basis of the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), a triennial interview survey of U.S. families undertaken by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The survey collects information on families’
total income but focuses primarily on detailed information about their balance sheets. The
survey is regarded as the most authoritative source in the United States regarding micro-
level data on household assets and liabilities.1
1The SCF survey adopts two techniques for random sampling: a standard, geography-based random
sample of U.S. households and a complementary sample selected from a list of statistical records derived
from tax returns to disproportionately include high-wealth families, which hold a relatively large share of
rarely held assets, which include tax-exempt bonds and non-corporate businesses. Because of such a sampling
design, the SCF data is statistically representative of the U.S. household population.
19
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Figure 3.1: The uneven distribution of wealth in the U.S.
Figure 3.2: The dominant presence of business households in the top percentiles of the U.S.
wealth distribution.
CHAPTER 3. LIFE-CYCLE PROFILE OF ASSET HOLDINGS 21
3.1 Cross-sectional features of household wealth holdings
Before I use statistical analysis for extracting the information about the life-cycle pattern
of household asset holdings from the SCF data, some summary statistics of the U.S. wealth
distribution and household asset composition are outlined as follows. In Figure 3.1, I show
that the share of wealth held by the top 15%, 5% and 1% in the U.S. wealth distribution
has been increasing over the past thirty years, while the proportion of wealth held by the
bottom 80% keeps shrinking. The vertical axis refers to the fraction of total wealth; the
horizontal axis represents the survey years. Each data point refers to the percentage of total
wealth held by a wealth group in a given survey year. Data of the same wealth group is
marked by the same color and connected by a dashed line. The horizontal dashed lines
represent the average of percentage wealth holdings for a wealth percentile across survey
years. On average, for example, the top 1% holds more than 30% of the total wealth during
the period 1983-2013.
To take a closer look at the constituents of the top percentiles in the wealth distribution,
I show in Figure 3.2 the percentage appearance of business households within a top per-
centile. The horizontal axis refers to the top percentiles. The presence of business house-
holds rises dramatically from an average of only 15% in the top 99th percentile households
of the wealth distribution to more than 60% in the top first percentile. Although answering
why the wealth concentration and the fraction of entrepreneurs in the U.S. data have been
trending upward over the past thirty years is beyond the scope of this study, Figures 3.1 and
3.2 report that business households account for a small fraction of the population but hold
a disproportional share of total wealth in the economy. The empirical findings imply that
business households form the majority of the top percentiles.
Some argue that business households are richer simply because of their receiving higher
incomes. Figure 3.3 casts doubt on this argument by showing that the net worth of business
CHAPTER 3. LIFE-CYCLE PROFILE OF ASSET HOLDINGS 22
Figure 3.3: The composition of household asset portfolio across income quintiles.
households systematically dwarf that of worker households within the same income group.
In Figure 3.3, I report the average wealth holdings of business and nonbusiness households
and their percentage presence within the income quintiles. To emphasize the heterogeneity
at the household subgroup level, I plot the bar chart for business households in the left
panel of Figure 3.3, and the one for nonbusiness households in the right panel. Note that
the horizontal axis of the two panels represents the same income quintiles generated from
the income distribution over all the U.S. households, rather than a particular occupational
subgroup of households. The vertical axis shows the amount of household total wealth.
On top of each total wealth bar is the percentage presence of a particular occupational
subgroup in the associated income quintile. To describe the variation in the composition of
asset portfolio across occupational and income groups, I color the fraction of total wealth
in the form of housing asset in red, and that of net financial asset holdings in yellow.
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For example, when we look at the left-most income quintile on the left panel, it shows
that business households take up only five percent of the first income quintile, and that the
amount of their net financial asset holdings significantly exceeds the amount of their hous-
ing stock. In comparison, we know on the right panel that the first income quintile is mostly
composed of nonbusiness households, which constitutes 95% of the income quintile. Their
wealth seems to be divided evenly between the categories of housing and financial assets,
which is different from the asymmetrical allocation of wealth for business households in
the same income quintile.
On the left panel, the average of financial asset holding in business households is appar-
ently in excess of that of housing asset holdings in each income group. In contrast, the right
panel shows that only the highest two income groups of worker households have the ratio
of financial assets to housing asset bigger than one. Besides, the total wealth (i.e., the full
height of a stacked bar in Figure 3.3) of business households is larger than that of worker
households within the same income quintile. Such a difference in the level of wealth be-
tween the two groups becomes even more pronounced as we look at higher income groups.
Figure 3.3 shows that the saving behaviors of business households are distinct from those of
wage earner households, even after controlling for household income. This phenomenon
implies that the concentration of wealth doesn’t simply result from the higher incomes
earned by entrepreneurs. In other words, entrepreneurs are induced to save more probably
by incentives beyond ordinary precautionary saving and consumption smoothing motives.
3.2 Life-cycle patterns of household wealth holdings
In this section, I estimate the age profiles of asset holdings for business and wage earner
households, respectively. The outcome of the estimation is to be used for examining the
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match between the proposed life-cycle model and the data. I outline the statistical proce-
dure that leads to the findings in Appendix A. The model setup and its solution to replicate
the observed life-cycle profile of wealth holdings will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.2.1 Housing asset and financial wealth
To characterize the key features of household wealth holdings over the life cycle, I need
to make some judgments in the first place. I reorganize the asset categories in the SCF
data to form a dichotomous classification of asset items that appear in a typical household
balance sheet. I define the primary residence as housing asset.2 I pool business equity
with financial assets as well as assets under the categories of vehicles, other residential
property, and nonresidential real estate as a merged category, labeled as financial assets.
The difference between the value of the newly-defined financial assets class and the total
of household liabilities is called financial wealth, if the difference is positive; otherwise,
the difference is simply referred to as net financial assets. In the subsequent analysis of
this study, either the empirical or the quantitative part, housing asset and financial wealth
are the only two asset classes of interest.3 The dichotomous classification is intended to
emphasize on the function of housing asset for serving as collateral for loans in the form
of home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), a common household external financing device
that is secured by residential property in practice. This observation justifies the assumption
on the role of housing as collateralizable assets in the proposed life-cycle model.
2The primary residence category defined in the SCF includes mobile homes and their sites, the parts of
farms and ranches not used for farming or ranching business, etc.
3In this analysis, all dollar amounts from the SCF are adjusted to 2013 dollars using the current methods
version of the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPIURS).
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3.2.2 Entrepreneurs and wage earners
To group the SCF respondents into business households and wage earners households, I
utilize the responses to occupational questions of the SCF questionnaire, including “Work-
ing now? Unemployed and looking for work last year? Work for self/someone else/other?”
I assume for analysis simplicity that self-employment in the SCF is a genuine entrepreneur-
ship, rather than other kinds of self-employment out of necessity or as a last-resort option.
With this rationale in mind, I treat the self-employed as entrepreneurs for their similarity of
owning a business in spite of the variation in the definition of being self-employed across
government agents and academic research. I purge household samples whose head’s work
status is in neither of the aforementioned two work status categories.4
3.2.3 Synthetic cohort panel
I follow the synthetic cohort techniques described in Deaton and Paxson (1994) to construct
a pseudo panel or synthetic cohort panel from the SCF cross-sectional data collected during
the period 1983-2013. The reason that I skip the two official SCF panel data of the periods
1983-1989 and 2007-2009 is that these panel data are short in the time dimension, which is
not suitable for drawing statistical inference on the age profile of household asset holdings
under the intertwined influence of age, cohort and time effects. The implementation of
the synthetic cohort techniques in the current case proceeds in two steps: The first step
is to identify the age of the reference household head, I associate every household in the
4Self-employed people defined in the analysis include independent contractors, sole proprietors of busi-
nesses and those with partnerships in businesses. This definition of work status corresponds to the group
of respondents in the SCF summary data set labeled as 2 (self-employed/partnership). In the survey of year
2013, for example, the fraction of households being purged is around 33% (a category of household in the
SCF includes the retired/disabled, not working or out of the labor force, age 65 or older, and those under
65). The household-level panel generated can be adjusted to a per-adult-equivalent basis using the OECD
equivalence scale, which assigns a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.7 to each additional adult, and 0.5 to each
child. The patterns are not noticeably different from that without the equivalence scale adjustment, so I don’t
include them in the report.
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1983 survey with a cohort that falls in one of evenly-divided age brackets between the
ages of 20 and 85 with a length of five years, starting with the 20-24 years old age group.
The second step is to compute the weighted descriptive statistics of housing and financial
wealth holdings based on the synthetic cohort panel. For example, for the cohort of worker
households born in 1961—who were 22 years old in the year 1983—I use the 1983 survey
to calculate the median housing stock for the worker households of age 22. The result
forms the first data point for the worker households of cohort 1961 in 1983. The second
data point of the same cohort is the median housing asset holdings of 25-year-olds (22+3)
in the 1986 survey (1983+3). The rest of the data points associated with the cohort 1961
could be tracked out with the same method based on the remaining surveys of years from
1989 to 2013 until they are last observed at age 52 in the survey of year 2013. The weighted
descriptive statistics of all the cohorts when the cross-sectional data are available could be
obtained in the same way. They constitute the synthetic panel data which I utilize in the
subsequent statistical analysis.
3.2.4 Partially linear regression
Quantitative life-cycle models in the literature typically abstract from business cycle fluc-
tuations and cohort effects. Empirical life-cycle profiles of wealth holdings can be used
to assess the performance of life-cycle simulation models in matching the data. In this
study, I employ a partially linear regression model in which cohort and time (measured in
years) effects are controlled for by dummy variables to extract the nonlinear relationship
between the level of household asset holdings and the household head’s attribute, age. This
empirical exercise follows the procedure itemized in Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger
(2007), which is based on the econometric techniques proposed by Robinson (1988). The
procedure is outlined as the following:
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First, to disentangle the intertwined influence of age, time, and cohort effects on house-
hold housing and financial wealth holdings, I estimate a partially linear regression model
defined by:
yit = constant +∑βicohorti +∑βtyeart +m(ageit)+ εit , (3.1)
where yit is the level of a specific statistic of household asset holdings for cohort i in the
survey of year t, the variable cohorti is a dummy for each cohort i except the oldest one,
yeart is a dummy for each survey year t , m(ageit) = E(yit |ageit) is a nonlinear smoothing
function of ageit , where ageit denotes the age of cohort i in the survey year t, {β j} are
parameters for cohort ( j = i) and time ( j = t) effects, respectively, and εit is an independent,
zero mean, random error.
To identify the separate effects of age, cohort and time in spite of the linear dependence
among them, I assume that time effects are orthogonal to a time trend and that their sum
is normalized to zero, by following Deaton (1997). The assumptions imply that I attribute
time trends (the secular economic growth) to age and cohort effects, and use the time effects
to capture cyclical fluctuations (business-cycle effects) that average to zero over the long
run. The subsequent analysis of the nonlinear age profile of asset holdings is fulfilled by
following the estimation procedure proposed in Speckman (1988) (see Appendix A).
3.2.5 Life-cycle patterns of asset holdings
As shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, the life-cycle patterns for housing and financial wealth
holdings of the (median) business and worker households estimated in this study are at vari-
ance with a key prediction of the standard life-cycle model that do not account for market
frictions, age-dependent utility of consumption, and home production. The conventional
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Figure 3.4: Age profiles of housing and financial asset holdings.
Figure 3.5: Age profiles of housing and financial asset holdings (shown at the same scale).
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life-cycle theory indicates that the ratio of housing to non-housing consumption is indepen-
dent of age. The trends of housing stock should follow the same pattern as financial wealth
holdings. On the contrary, the age profiles of housing stock and financial wealth hold-
ings are nonlinear for both worker and entrepreneur households, and evolve apparently in
different styles throughout the lifetime.
The left panel of Figure 3.4 shows the age profile of wealth holdings for the median
wage earning households. First, their housing stock starts at a higher level than the initial
amount of their financial wealth holding. The former is more than twice as much as the
latter. This feature conforms to the common notion that young households prefer to hold
more housing stock than financial assets. In a short period of time, around their early 40s,
the median wage earning households’ net financial asset are turning negative, while their
housing asset holding is approaching its lifetime maximum, which is over three times as
much as its starting level. The negative net financial asset holding may imply that early in
life the median worker households build up their housing stock by borrowing.
Second, the timing for the financial wealth holding of the median worker households
hitting its lifetime maximum is about ten years later than that for the housing stock. The
former takes place on the eve of retirement ages. As the median worker households enter
the retirement stage of the life cycle, both of the age profiles exhibit a decreasing pattern.
However, the magnitude of dissaving in terms of the percentage change is much larger for
financial asset holding than for housing asset holding. At the age of 85, the financial asset
holding drops by one thirds from the lifetime maximum almost back to its initial level.
Conversely, the housing asset holding decreases by one fourth from 150 thousand dollars
to 115 thousand dollars. One interpretation is that households face higher costs, physical
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and psychological, in adjusting the stock of housing than that in adjusting the holding of
financial assets.5
In the median wage earner households, the age profile of net financial asset holding is
S-shaped and that of housing stock is hump-shaped but exhibiting a flattening out pattern
in the second half of their lifetime. In comparison, regardless of whether the asset type is
housing or financial wealth, asset holding in the median business household grows steadily
over the life cycle, as illustrated on the right panel of Figure 3.4. The significant rate of
financial asset accumulation reflects the ever-growing size of business equity held by the
median business households throughout the lifetime.
5Due to the configurational variety and the immobility of houses, potential buyers and sellers in the
housing market need to put in considerable amounts of time and resources to acquire information about the
value of a specific housing unit. There are implicit and explicit search costs associated with a transaction
of housing assets. These encompass the opportunity costs of time associated with market search and the
pecuniary costs such as brokerage and agent fees, legal fees, and origination fees. In addition, households
have to move to a new house, which entails physical moving costs and psychological costs of accommodating
to a new living environment.
Chapter 4
The Model Economy
Consider an overlapping generations economy populated by households who live for at
most T (=14) periods, each of which is 5 years long, starting with the age of 20 years old.
There are four sectors: households, production, financial intermediary, and government.
Households make consumption-saving decisions: They derive utility from consuming con-
sumption goods and housing services, and save in the form of housing asset as well as
interest-bearing financial assets. Household occupations are determined at the end of the
preceding period by weighing between running a business for seeking the economic rent
for entrepreneurship (i.e., being an entrepreneur; a business household) or working for oth-
ers in exchange for wages (i.e., being a worker; a worker household). After reaching the
retirement age of Tr years old, workers are forced to retire and live on lifetime savings and
social security benefits. Elder entrepreneurs of age Tr or older make the same decisions
except that they can keep running a business until they choose to exit entrepreneurship per-
manently. At the end of each period, households (younger than Tr years old) perceive the
realization of shocks to labor efficiency and entrepreneurial talent. Financially constrained
households may use housing asset as collateral for borrowing money through a financial
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intermediary. The government consumes a fixed share of total output, collects tax revenues,
and operates the social security system.
4.1 Demographics
Let t denote a point of time, and g a household head’s model age in the g-th period of
his/her life. In other words, the household head (or alternatively, household, for simplicity)
is born (i.e. enter the model) at the first period, g = 1. Households face a probability pg of
surviving up to age g+ 1 conditional on being alive at age g, and could live up to age T .
There is no population growth. The measure of the newborn at t equals the total measure
of the deceased at t−1 and thus the size of the population is stable over time.
4.2 Preferences
In specific, the household i maximizes the value of expected, discounted lifetime utility
derived from two distinct types of consumption flows: housing services, {sig}, and non-
housing consumption goods, {cig}, over the life cycle from g = 1 to T . For notational
simplicity, I drop the subscript i hereafter when no confusion arises. The utility function of
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in which g(·, ·) is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator function of the
services flows from housing and non-housing consumption goods in the Cobb-Douglas
form of c1−θg s
θ
g . I assume there exists a linear one-to-one mapping between one unit of
housing capital hg and one unit of the derivative service flow sg. The preference for housing
services relative to non-housing consumption good is denoted by θ . The variable σ is
the coefficient of relative risk aversion associated with the composite consumption goods
aggregated by the Cobb-Douglas aggregator. The variable dg represents the amount of
wealth the household head bequests upon death at age g. The household discounts the
future utility at rate β . The parameter q dictates the household bequest motivation, which
takes the value of zero if the household has no motivation in making a bequest upon death.1
In equation (4.1), E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information available to
the household at the point of time when entering into the model.
4.3 Endowment
Working-age households enter a period with an occupation that was chosen at the end of the
period prior to the current one. Every choice is made with the latest perceived individual-
specific information regarding labor productivity and entrepreneurial talent, both of which
are drawn by chance and defined by respective stochastic processes defined below:
4.3.1 Endowment of labor efficiency
At the end of period g, households are endowed with labor efficiency of the value de-
termined by the product of two components denoted by ēg and ẽg. The former is a de-
terministic component associated with age to reflect the effect of working experience on
1q is set to 1 in the baseline model and the tax policy experiments.
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labor productivity. The latter captures the impact of the labor income shocks that follow an
AR(1) in logs: log ẽg = ρe log ẽg−1 + εe,g, where εe,g is a white noise process with variance
σ2εe , and ρe determines the persistence of the labor income shock.
4.3.2 Endowment of entrepreneurial talent
Households are endowed with entrepreneurial talent at the end of every period, as long as
they are not retired, or they are entrepreneurs but have not chosen to exit entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurial talents are related to a pool of business projects, K = {k0,k1, . . . ,kNk},
where ki denotes the minimum capital needed to implement the project i, which also rep-
resents the required business talent for managing the project. The variable k0 indicates the
situation that the household has no entrepreneurial idea at all. The subscripts from one to
Nk refer to the size ranking of business projects in ascending order. Index 1 referring to the
smallest business project and so on. The required business capital of a project is indivisible
in the sense that the household either undertakes the project with sufficient funds to fully
satisfy the project’s capital requirement or leaves it.
4.3.3 Development of entrepreneurial talent
To embody the notion that entrepreneurs must have a basic talent before acquiring an ad-
vanced one (in other words, the entrepreneurial talent develops gradually without jump), I
follow Quadrini (2000) to specify the evolution of entrepreneurial talent with the following
setting: the probability of having a new entrepreneurial talent k̃ conditional on having had
the talent k j is positive in two cases: one is when the realization of the new talent k̃ is ex-
actly the talent for running the next-highest investment scale relative to the one employed
currently ki (in which case, k̃ = ki+1 > ki) and the other is when the development of the
entrepreneurial talent stagnates such that the talent for the project currently undertaken is
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carried over to the next period, and as a result, k̃ = ki. In short, the conditional probability
distribution is given by:
Pki(k̃)

> 0 if k̃ ∈ {ki,ki+1} and i < Nk,
= 1 if k̃ = ki and i = Nk,
= 0 otherwise.
(4.2)
In the following analysis, I will restrict my attention to the case where Nk = 1 for compu-
tational simplicity.
4.3.4 Intergenerational transmission of labor productivity
When households die and exit the model, they are replaced by their own offspring of age
one, who partially inherit their parents’ labor productivity upon death dictated by an AR(1)
process: logec = ρep logep + εep, where the subscript p indicates that the variable is asso-
ciated with the parents, and the subscript c with the offspring. The variable εep is a white
noise process with variance σ2ep.
4.3.5 Inheritance of entrepreneurial talent
Based on Swedish adoption data, Lindquist, Sol, and Van Praag (2015) study the origins of
the intergenerational association in entrepreneurship, and find that parental entrepreneur-
ship increases the probability of children’s entrepreneurship by about 60%. To factor this
finding into the present model in a parsimonious way, I allow the entrepreneurial knowledge
as well as the business condition (reflected by the momentary business shocks the parental
entrepreneurs experience upon death) to be passed down to their progeny via a one-to-one
direct correspondence. It is noteworthy that the model abstracts from the consideration of
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within-household wealth inheritance for modeling simplicity. The technical makeshift is
to redistribute total unintended bequests by the government as a lump-sum transfer to the
whole population alive, an assumption which is common in the literature. Yang (2009)
finds that the numerical outcomes are robust regardless of how the wealth of the deceased
is redistributed back to the model economy in the study of life-cycle consumption.
4.4 Production
The economy has two sectors of production for one consumption good. One sector which
is referred to as the non-entrepreneurial or corporate sector is composed of firms operating
in a frictionless, perfectly competitive environment typifying firms with diversified risk
and anonymity of the operations. The other sector is called the entrepreneurial or non-
corporate sector which comprises of entrepreneurial firms whose business activities are
tied up with the owner’s decisions (production factor hiring and external financing) subject
to their wealth and talent (e.g., entrepreneurial talent, the amounts of housing asset and
own capital). Due to non-diversifiable firm-specific risk, firms in the entrepreneurial sector
face stricter liquidity constraints than firms in the corporate sector when dealing with the
financial intermediary for business loans .
4.4.1 Corporate sector
The corporate sector is represented by a representative firm operating a standard Cobb-
Douglas production technology: Yc = F(Kc,Nc) = Kαc N
1−α
c , where α is the capital income
share in the corporate sector, Kc and Nc are the aggregate capital and efficient units of labor
in this sector. Capital depreciates at a rate δk.
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4.4.2 Entrepreneurial sector
Entrepreneurs run their own technology and produce output according to the production
function, y = f (k,n,z) = z(kαn1−α)ν , where k is the required capital investment for the
business project, n is efficiency units of labor employed in the firm, z is a firm-specific
technology shock that remains unknown at the end of the previous period when the deci-
sions on being an entrepreneur and the amount of business loan are made. The technology
shock is unobserved until the beginning of the present period. The parameter α denotes
the capital income share in the corporate sector. The parameter ν determines the degree of
decreasing returns to scale in capital and labor exhibited in the production function of the
entrepreneurial sector. It is a parameter that captures an entrepreneur’s limited span of man-
agerial control (a fixed factor reflecting his entrepreneurial talent) when his management is
gradually stretched over larger and larger projects as discussed in Lucas (1978).
The technology shock z ∈ Z = {z1, . . . ,zNz} have finite states, following a first-order
Markov process with project-specific transition probability Qk(z′|z). As in Meh (2005), the
first element of the set Z is assumed to be a bad shock that is highly persistent such that
Qk(z1|z1) = 1. Consequently, if an entrepreneur receives a bad shock z1 at the beginning of
the current period, he will choose to exit entrepreneurship with which the current project
k is associated. It is worth noting that an entrepreneur-turned worker still has the oppor-
tunity to re-enter entrepreneurship in the future (as long as he is not retired) because, by
construction, the probability for a worker to start up a small firm from scratch is positive,
Pk0(k1)> 0.
The amount of invested capital depreciates in a stochastic fashion based on the belief
that the end-of-period value of the invested capital should be positively related to the result
of the entrepreneurial activity, which is primarily governed by the realization of the tech-
nological shock. The introduction of stochastic depreciation takes into consideration the
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possibility of enormous losses in entrepreneurial activities. If the entrepreneur receives a
good shock to production, then the residual value of the invested capital after depreciation
is high, and vice versa. The depreciate rate is denoted by δz, a project-specific function of
the shocks z.
4.4.3 Entrepreneurs’ profit maximization problem
Given a business project whose capital requirement is k, the entrepreneurial household’s
business profit (i.e. revenue net of the cost of production factors) and labor demand is










with rl = rd , if k 6 a, or rd +(k− a)γ/k, otherwise. The variable rl dictates the cost of
capital financed from either internal or external sources. The business profit π(a,k,z) is
defined as business revenue net of labor costs (including the social security contribution)
and the cost of capital externally sourced. If the amount of own business capital a (equiva-
lent to the household’s financial asset holding) is sufficient to cover the capital requirement
of the business project k (that is, a > k), the business is entirely self-financed and the cor-
responding cost of capital is simply the opportunity cost rd . Otherwise, if the scale of the
investment exceeds the amount of own capital (that is, k > a), the business project has to be
partially financed with debt and the cost of capital increases with the debt-to-capital ratio
(since the intermediation cost γ is positive). Because an entrepreneur is a price taker, the
2I assume that entrepreneurs rely on external labor for production no matter whether their labor demand
can be fulfilled by endowed labor efficiency or not. In other words, entrepreneurs always employ external
labor input and earn a wage.
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In this economy, it is assumed that debts must be repaid to the financial intermediary
sector before the payment of income taxes. This assumption is consistent with the fact that,
in general, most business capital expenses are tax deductible.
4.5 Housing
Household incomes can be either consumed (c), invested in an entrepreneurial project as
business capital (k), saved in a risk-free interest-bearing financial asset (a), or invested in
residential capital (h). In addition, financial assets a represent loans as well. A positive
amount of financial assets is a claim to the same amount of non-housing capital, while a
negative amount of financial assets represent total liabilities of the size equal to the un-
signed amount of the financial asset holdings.
There are no contingent claims markets for hedging idiosyncratic productivity shocks
or mortality. Consumption smoothing in the economy is carried out by adjusting the levels
of the financial asset holdings and the residential stock. Following Yang (2009), I consider
non-convex adjustment costs of housing stock that reflects the monetary value of search,
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legal costs, costs of readjusting home furnishings to a new house and so on:
Ω(ht ,ht+1) =

0 if ht+1 ∈ [(1−µl)ht ,(1+µu)ht ],
ρsht +ρpht+1 otherwise.
(4.6)
The formulation implies that a non-zero adjustment cost of changing housing consumption
is incurred only if the adjustment on the quantity of housing asset holdings is significant
enough to fall outside a zero-transaction-cost range that accounts for common home ren-
ovation or normal depreciation of housing stock, in which cases no housing units change
hands. I assume that transfers of residential capital between households are carried out
at the end of the period. This will guarantee that housing services are enjoyed from the
amount of residential stock brought into the period.
Furthermore, I assume a correspondence between the size of the houses and the con-
sumption benefits that households derive from it. Using this residential capital, the tech-
nology for producing housing services is linear and simple. One unit of residential stock
h generates one unit of service s. One important feature of housing that differentiates it
from liquid financial assets is its indivisibility. To capture this property, I assume that there
is a minimum house size, h̄min > 0, such that h > h̄min, as commonly seen in the literature
for the lumpiness of housing. Besides, to buy a house, households must satisfy a mini-
mum down payment requirement as a fraction λ of the house value. The role of housing as
collateral for loans is discussed in the next subsection.
4.6 Financial intermediary
The financial intermediary sector consists of competitive banks, which collect deposits
from households with positive balance by paying the interest rate rd and lend the proceeds
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to households and firms that need a loan. There is an intermediary cost γ incurred for every
unit of funds intermediated to households who undertake entrepreneurial activities, while
loans made to workers or firms that produce in the corporate sector use no resources and
incur no extra cost except rd per unit of borrowings. Competition among banks makes
intermediation profit zero. This assumption implies that the lending rate equals rd for loans
to the corporate sector and workers, and as mentioned above, rl(k,a) = rd +(k−ak )
+γ for
loans to entrepreneurs who are running a risky business project of scale k with insufficient
internal funds of size a.
Households can borrow up to a maximum amount, which depends on the lending policy
of the intermediaries. This lending policy consists of lending up to the amount that the
borrower will be able to repay with certainty at the end of the next period. If an entrepreneur
plans to devote k units of capital in the business project, then the minimum business income










where Bmin(k) denotes the business income of the project k when the realization of the
technology shock takes the minimum value zmin (the worst technology shock), the variable
w denotes the wage rate for one unit of labor efficiency, n stands for the efficiency units of
labor to be employed, τss is the tax rate for social security contribution, half of which is
matched up by the entrepreneur as practiced in the U.S., and δzmin is the depreciation rate
of capital for the project k given the shock zmin.3
To derive the limit imposed on net financial asset position a, it is assumed that k > a,
that is, the household’s own fund is inadequate for undertaking the project k without having
access to external funding. It implies that the applicable interest rate is the lending rate rl ,
3Note that for k = 0 (i.e. a worker or retiree), Imin(0) = 0.
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which varies with the amount of external funds k−a. Given this assumption and the lending
policy of the bank, the payment for paying back the one-period loan, (1+ rl)(k−a), must
be less than or equal to the amount of the minimum business income plus incomes from
other sources (such as labor income or social security benefits) and the value of housing
asset (collateral for the loan). More precisely, the lower bound imposed on the net financial








where (1− λ ) represents the maximum fraction of the housing stock currently owned
against which the household can borrow and Xnext ≡ (1 − τss2 )wẽg+1ēg+11{g+1<Tr} +
b1{g+1≥Tr} denotes incomes of the household of age g+1 in the next period from any
sources other than their own businesses, and 1{A} is the indicator function, which takes
the value of 1, if statement A attached to it is true, and 0, otherwise. That the constraint
involves the value of the housing asset currently owned (hg), rather than the house the
household will buy (hg+1), makes the loan resemble a HELOC rather than a mortgage, be-
cause a HELOC is a loan that uses the house currently owned as collateral for whatever
expenses the household wants to finance. In short, (1−λ ) denotes the maximum fraction
of the housing asset against which households can borrow in the form of a HELOC.
The borrowing constraint (4.8) is also applicable to worker households. In the event
that kg+1 = 0 (worker), the level of loans the household can make is bounded above by the
sum of collateral and the discounted value of the next-period labor income, (1− λ )hg +
wẽg+1ēg+1
1+rl
. In the same vein, the maximum level of loans a retiree can borrow reduces to
(1−λ )hg + b1+rl , where b denotes the social security benefits the retiree will receive.
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4.7 Government
The government is engaged in the following activities: collecting tax revenues to finance
the public expenditure G, paying interests on the government debt, and implementing a
self-financed pay-as-you-go social security system. The government expenditure is exoge-
nously given as a fixed fraction of total output. A balanced budget is imposed at every
point of time. In the baseline model, the government levies progressive taxes on total in-
come. Following Cagetti and De Nardi (2009), I allow the tax schedules to be different for
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (including workers and retirees) and adopt the func-
tional form proposed by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) that assume the total taxes Ti(X) on





+ τstX , (4.9)
where X is the taxable income of the household, τst captures state taxes or transfer pro-
portional to the taxable household income, and the subscript could be indexed by i = e,w
for entrepreneurs and workers, respectively. τst is endogenously determined in the sta-
tionary equilibrium such that the government budget is balanced. The set of parameters
{ai, j}i=e,w, j=1,2,3 are estimated from microeconomic data.
The government runs a simple social security program which collects payroll taxes
from labor income at the rate τss. All the proceeds are equally distributed to all the retired
agents. Since the amount of benefits is the same for all households regardless of the amount
they contributed in the working stage of lifetime, this particular social security program,
as pointed out in Huggett (1996), has a strong redistribution effect as does the U.S. Social
Security program, for the reason that the value of social security benefits received by low
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(high) income household is greater (smaller) than the amount of social security contribu-




Worker and business households enter
period t with respective asset holdings a,h




Given z, business households
decide whether to exit
or continue entrepreneurship.
Business idea k̃ and
labor efficiency ẽ of
period t +1 are realized.
Before leaving period t households
make allocation and occupation decisions
(i.e., choose a′,h′,c and k′ from {0,k, k̃}).
Figure 4.1: Timeline of events.
4.8 The household’s optimization problem
A household enters a period with the knowledge of a, h, k, and e. The work status of the
current period (or equivalently, the business project to be implemented, k) is determined in
the preceding period. Figure 4.1 illustrates the timeline of events. A dashed line indicates
the outcome of the event is determined by luck. The household head faces a mortality shock
by the end of period t, which determines whether he/she will live through period t + 1 or
die. This random event is represented by the biforked solid line.
4.8.1 The timing of events
At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs perceive the realized level of the firm-
specific technology shock z, and decide whether to exit entrepreneurship, or alternatively,
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how much units of labor efficiency, n, to hire for starting up or continuing their businesses.
Workers simply rent out their labor efficiency for a wage. Labor and capital are supplied
to firms in both of the production sectors, and production takes place. During retirement
households receive social security benefits.
At the end of each period, working-age household heads observe the realization of a
pair of individual-specific shocks (labor productivity ẽ and entrepreneurial talent k̃), while
elder entrepreneurs perceive only the realization of the latter. Knowing the set of projects
in their reach (that is, the entrepreneurial talent currently implemented, k, and the newly-
acquired entrepreneurial talent, k̃), working-age agents weigh between working for others
and running a business project chosen from the project pool, {k, k̃}. Elder entrepreneurs
decide whether to retire or continue running their businesses. Regardless of work status,
households then determine how much to save by adjusting the levels of housing stock and
the financial asset holdings, and how much to leave for consumption. Finally, uncertainty
about early death is revealed.
4.8.2 Recursive formulation of the household’s optimization problem
Before defining the stationary equilibrium, it is useful to write the agent’s problem in re-
cursive form. The state of a household at the beginning of a period after the realization of
the technology shock is described by six state variables: age (g), labor productivity (e), net
financial asset holdings (a), housing stock (h), the business investment (k), and the tech-
nology shock to his production (z). Recall if k = k0 the household head is a worker or a
retiree; if not, an entrepreneur. Households are price takers in the goods and factor markets.
I normalize the price of the consumption good to 1. Accordingly, rd and rl are real interest
rates; w are real wages.
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For notation simplicity, I refer to as Sg ≡ {g,a,h,k,z,e} the state variable set that cap-
tures the full information about a household at the beginning of period g, and refer to the
set of state variables that characterize the household at the end of the period of age g as
S̃g ≡ {g,a,h,k,z,e, k̃, ẽ}. Note that S̃g is simply an augmented set from Sg with information
not realized until the end of the period: the entrepreneurial talent k̃ and the shock to labor
efficiency ẽ. In order to further simplify notation, I drop subscripts g and use a prime on a
variable to indicate its value in the next period.
The households’ utility maximization problem at the end of age g, after observing the
realization of the idiosyncratic shocks k̃ and ẽ, can be formulated recursively as:






















h′ ≥ h̄min, c > 0, d > 0, k′ ∈ {0,k, k̃}. (4.13)
with X = rda1{a>k}+ π(a,k,z) + (1− τss2 )wẽē1{g<Tr}+ b1{g≥Tr}, d ≡ a
′+ h+ > 0, and
i = e, if k > 0 or w, otherwise. 1{A} stands for an indicator function taking the value of
unity when the event A is true. V (Sg) denotes the household head’s value function at the be-
ginning of age g. Ṽ (S̃g) denotes the value function at the end of age g. In the period budget
constraint, equation (4.11), X stands for the amount of the household taxable incomes, ζ is
the lump-sum unintended bequest redistribution, and b is the Social Security benefits. The
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household’s optimization decision is subject to the budget constraint (4.11), a borrowing
constraints (4.12) and a non-negative bequest constraint. In addition, the household total
income X is defined as the sum of the return on savings rda, business profit π(a,k,z), labor
income net of social security contribution (if the household head is in the working-age stage
of lifetime) (1− τss2 )wẽē, and social security benefits (if the household has been retired) b.
The solution is given by the policy functions of the next period’s financial asset holding
ga(S̃g), housing asset holding gh(S̃g), and the business investment gk(S̃g).
The value function at the beginning of the period is the expected value of the end-of-
period value function, Ṽ , conditional on the information available at the beginning of the
current period:
V (Sg) = ∑
ẽ,k̃
Ṽ (S̃g)Pk(k̃)Γ(ẽ|e), (4.14)
where Γ is the transition probability of the first-order Markov process approximating
the logarithm of labor income shock AR(1) process, log ẽ, using the techniques given in
Tauchen (1986) with Γ(ẽ|e) being the transition probability from the current state e to the
next state ẽ. Pk(k̃) is the conditional probability distribution concerning the evolution of
entrepreneurial talent defined above.
4.9 Definition of stationary equilibrium
The distribution of households with respect to individual states Sg for age group g at time t
is denoted by the measure µ tg(Sg). Because the economy does not feature aggregate shocks,
I can appeal to the law of large numbers to ensure that, in any stationary equilibrium, prices
including wages and the interest rates are not functions of distribution of households, and
the distribution µ is invariant over time.
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Definition. Given a fiscal policy regime {G,τss,Ti=e,w(·)}, a stationary equilibrium for the
model economy consists of aggregate capital and labor demands in the corporate sector
{Kc,Nc}, relative prices of labor and capital {w,rd}, a lump-sum distribution of
unintended bequests ζ , an endogenous state tax rate τst , a set of value functions
{V (Sg),Ṽ (S̃g)}Tg=1, individual decisions rules {ga(S̃g),gh(S̃g),gk(S̃g)}Tg=1,
entrepreneurial-sector firms’ decision rules n(k,z), and age-dependent (but time-invariant)
measures of households {µg(Sg)}Tg=1, such that:
1. Given the prices and the government policy, consumers maximize utility and en-
trepreneurs maximize business profits.
2. The marginal product of labor and the marginal product of capital (net of depre-
ciation) in the corporate sector are equal to w and rd: w = (1− α)Kαc N−αc , and
rd = αKα−1c N
1−α
c −δk.
3. Market clearing conditions are satisfied: Aggregate financial asset holdings equals
total capital employed in the noncorporate and corporate sectors plus government
investment, and the aggregate labor input equals the labor efficiency summed over
the population.
4. The government budget balances: Total tax revenues collected equal government
expenses G (including government purchases Gp and government debt services Gi).
social security taxes are sufficient to cover the benefits paid to agents in retirement.
5. The amount of bequests equals the amount of inheritance received by people alive.
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Table 4.1: Parameters calibrated with moment-matching exercises.
Data Model
Parameter Target Value Value
Entrepreneurial sector
k1 Share of capital used by entrepreneurs 30% 27%
Pk0(k1) Share of entrepreneurs 12% 14%
z̄ Share of income earned by entrepreneurs 30% 35%
φ1 Ratio of median wealth of entrepreneurs to workers 8.0 8.1
Preferences
β Ratio of financial assets to housing asset 1.2 1.5
θ Assets owned by entrepreneurs 40% 30%
for g = 1, ...,T − 1 and for all B ∈ B(M) where M represents the space of state
variables {a,h,k,z,e}, B(M) is the Borel σ -algebra on M, Pg is the law of motion
generated by the exogenous transition probabilities of {k,z,e} and the policy func-
tions, {ga(S̃g),gh(S̃g),gk(S̃g)}.
4.10 Calibration
In this subsection I describe the parameters used in the baseline model that bears the sim-
ilarity to the U.S. economy. The model period lasts for five years, and correspondingly,
parameter calibration is made on a five-year basis, if appropriate. Six parameters are deter-
mined endogenously in the stationary equilibrium in that six macro statistics observed in
the U.S. economy are simultaneously matched by their counterparts that are computed in
the stationary equilibrium of the baseline model. The rest of model parameters are set up by
referring to the values commonly adopted in the literature. The computational procedure
used to compute the stationary equilibrium is described in Appendix B.
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Table 4.2: Parameters for demographics, preferences and endowment.
Parameter Calibration
Demographics, preferences and endowment
{pg}14g=1 Survival probability see text
σ Relative risk aversion 2.0
ρe Persistence of labor efficiency process 0.85
σ2εe Innovation of labor efficiency process 0.3
ē14g=1 Age-labor efficiency profile see text
Production
α Capital income share in corporate sector 0.25
ν Degree of return to scale in noncorporate sector 0.9
δk Annual depreciation rate of capital 10.9%
δh Annual depreciation rate of housing stock 1.7%
(δzb,δzg) Depreciation of business capital (0.88,0.44)
zg Good business shock to technology see text
Table 4.3: Parameters for housing markets, intermediary and government.
Parameter Calibration
Housing markets and financial intermediary
γ Financial intermediation cost 5.5%
h̄min Minimum consumption of housing services 0
(ρs,ρb) Transaction costs of houses (7%,2.5%)
(µl,µu) Range of no-costs housing stock change (7%,7%)
λ Down payment rate 15%
Government policy
Gp Consumption of goods and services 18.7% of GDP
Gd Debt services 3% of GDP
CHAPTER 4. THE MODEL ECONOMY 51
The parameters to be calibrated are divided into two groups. One group is related to
the household’s preference, including the discount factor, β , and the relative value of the
utility from housing services, θ . Their calibrations are made through matching the fol-
lowing data targets with their model counterparts: the ratio of aggregate financial wealth
to aggregate housing stock, and the fraction of total assets owned by entrepreneurs. Ac-
cording to the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), the average value for the
period 2002-2006 of private housing capital relative to total output is 1.29, and the same
statistic for non-housing capital of the same period of time is 1.47. The implied ratio of
financial capital stock to housing capital stock is around 1.2. The target value for the share
of entrepreneurial assets is 40%; see Nakajima, 2010. The other group of parameters con-
cerning entrepreneurial activities, including the size of the smallest business project, k1;
the probabilities of acquiring entrepreneurial talent for managing the project k1, Pk0(k1);
the conditional probability of drawing consecutive good business shocks in row, φ1; and
the average value of idiosyncratic productivity shock (z̄). These parameters are pinned
down altogether by matching the following four model aggregates with their data counter-
parts: the share of income earned by entrepreneurs should be 30% (see Kitao, 2008); the
ratio of median wealth of entrepreneurs to workers is 8.0 (see Kitao, 2008); the fraction of
capital used in the entrepreneurial sector is 0.3, as reported in Quadrini (2000) and Gravelle
and Kotlikoff (1995); and the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population is 12%, which is
widely accepted in the literature. Table 4.1 summarizes the parameters which should be
calibrated with moment-matching exercises.
The remaining model parameters are pinned down by referring to the values commonly
used in the literature. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 list this group of parameters by categorizing them
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into two groups: one group is pertaining to the setup of demographic structure, the pro-
duction sectors, and labor efficiency endowment, while the other is about the environment
setting of the housing market, financial intermediary, and the government sector.
4.10.1 Demographics and preferences
New-born household heads enter the economy at the age of 20. They are exposed to a
positive mortality probability after the retirement age of 65. For computational feasibility,
I set the maximum lifespan to 85 years. As a result, household exit the model for sure
upon turning 90. Over the life cycle, there are T = 14 periods (a model period is set to be
5 years long), and the retirement stage of life starting from period Tr = 10. The survival
probabilities {pg}Tg=1 are taken from the life table in Social Security Administration (2007).
The relative risk aversion coefficient σ is assumed to be 2.0, below the upper bound of
10 considered plausible by Mehra and Prescott (1985). The parameter θ which measures
how much the household values consumption of housing goods relative to consumption
of others is set to match the relative size of the housing and non-housing capital stock in
the stationary equilibrium. The other preference parameters include the discount factor β ,
which is calibrated such that the ratio of the aggregate amount of wealth to total output in
equilibrium matches its U.S. counterpart.
4.10.2 Labor efficiency endowment
The deterministic age-profile of labor productivity {ēg}Tg=1 is taken from Hansen (1993)
based on the Current Population Survey (CPS). The persistence ρe and variance σ2e of the
stochastic productivity process are estimated from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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(PSID) data by Altonji and Villanueva (2002).4 The persistence coefficient of the labor
productivity inheritance process, ρep, is taken from Zimmerman (1992), based on the Na-
tional longitudinal Survey (NLS), which measures the amount of intergenerational eco-
nomic mobility in the United States, and the residual variance σ2ep is taken from De Nardi
(2004).5
4.10.3 Shock to business production
I assume that there are three types of business projects in the model economy, character-
ized by respective minimum capital requirement {k1,k2,k3}. The production technology
employed in the corporate sector is distinguished from its counterpart in the entrepreneurial
sectors.
Given a project that embodies the entrepreneurial idea k (equivalently, a project of size
k), the technological shock z is assumed to take two values, zg,k and zb,k, which stands for
good shock and bad shock, respectively. The shock follows a first-order Markov process




 , for k = k1,k2,k3, (4.16)
4The parameters are aggregated into 5 years in order to be consistent with the model period. Since
retirement begins at the model age Tr, the deterministic term of labor productivity equals zero for agents of
age Tr or older.
5I set the possible realizations of the first-order Markov chains converted from the initial inherited labor
productivity process (ec) to be identical with the possible realizations of the lifetime labor productivity process
(ẽg).
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where, for the project of size k, φk denotes the conditional probability of receiving yet
another good technology shock in succession. The calibration of {φ j}3j=1 is to have model-
generated exit rates from entrepreneurship for agents with different levels of business ex-
perience to match the counterparts in the real world. Following Quadrini (2000), the prob-
abilities are set as follows: φk1 = 0.75 for the smallest project, φk2 = 0.92 for the mid-sized
project, and φk3 = 0.97 for the largest project. The justification behind this probability
setting is that, first, as argued in Quadrini (2000) based on the PSID data, the exit rate
from entrepreneurship decreases with entrepreneurial tenure.6 Second, households run-
ning larger businesses have higher entrepreneurial tenure; see Quadrini (1999). Hence,
smaller projects should be assigned larger probabilities of exiting entrepreneurship. This
calibration process gives an average exit rate from entrepreneurship of 0.20.
To determine the specific values of the technological shock for the business projects,
I assume that the bad technology gives rise to zero production for all the projects (that
is, zb,k = 0 for k = k1,k2,k3), and that the average of the technological shock z̄ to en-
trepreneurial projects is identical across all entrepreneurs. Therefore, given z̄ and the
project-specific conditional probabilities of receiving another good shock in row, φk, the
magnitude of the good shock, zg,k, can be derived from the following equation: zg,k =
z̄/φk, for k = k1,k2,k3.
4.10.4 Entrepreneurial talent
Given a business project of size k, the probability distribution that translates the en-
trepreneurial learning process—Pk(k̃), where k ∈ {k0,k1,k2,k3}—are set endogenously
such that the distribution of entrepreneurs in the stationary equilibrium of the baseline
6Quadrini (2000) reports that the exit rates from entrepreneurship are 0.447 , 0.308 , and 0.134 for
business owners with one year, two years, and three or more years of entrepreneurial tenure, respectively.
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model equals the imposed distribution of entrepreneurs among the three projects in ascend-
ing order of their size: 60, 30, and 10 percent. In the baseline model, the size of available
business project is reduced to only one, so there leaves Pk0(k1) to be set.
4.10.5 Production technology of the corporate sector
The production function in the corporate sector is the standard Cobb-Douglas type with the
share of income that goes to non-housing stock of capital, α , being set at 0.255, an average
of the same parameter estimated by Yang (2009) and Nakajima (2010) based on National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the Fixed Assets Tables. As for the parameter
ν that determines the degree of returns to scale in the entrepreneurial sector, I set it at 0.9,
which suggests that the share of output retained as rents by entrepreneurs is 0.10.7
4.10.6 Depreciation
The calibration of the stochastic depreciation rate, δz, is made under the following assump-
tion: the average depreciation rate for each project, conditional on survival, equals the
aggregate depreciation rate of non-housing capital, δk, and regardless of the investment
amount, the depreciation of invested capital for a project that receives the bad productivity
shock is δzb,k = 0.15. Based on this assumption, the depreciation value pertaining to a good




, for all k = k1,k2,k3, (4.17)
where φk is the conditional probability of a good shock defined above.
7Empirical study finds that capital and labor shares are relatively constant across countries and over
time, with labor shares around 0.65–0.70 and capital shares are around 0.20–0.25. These figures imply that
entrepreneurial returns could be in the neighborhood of 0.10 of output, which corresponds to a value of
ν=0.90.
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The annual depreciation rates of aggregate non-housing capital, δk, and housing cap-
ital, δh, are set at 9.4% and 1.7%, respectively, both of which are roughly the average of
estimates commonly seen in the literature.8
4.10.7 Housing
Based on the house value reported by homeowners in the 1992 wave of the PSID survey,
Cocco (2005) finds that the first, fifth, and tenth percentiles of reported house value distri-
bution are 2937, 11380, and 22026 US dollars, respectively. He argues that the surprisingly
low house value reported in the lower tail of distribution may be contaminated by reporting
errors and thus set his model’s minimum house value to be twenty thousand US dollars,
which I use for h̄min in the baseline model.
As in Yang (2009), the calibration of the non-convex costs for housing stock adjustment
is made by setting the parameters prescribing the zero-adjustment-cost range to be five
times the annual depreciation rate of housing capital (that is, µl = µu = 5δh ≈ 7%). I
set the selling and purchase costs per unit of housing asset, ρs and ρb, to be 7% and 2.5%,
respectively, based on the finding from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) in Gruber
and Martin (2003) that the median household spends 7 percent of a house’s value to sell it
and 2.5 percent to own it.
4.10.8 Financial intermediary
Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1992) document the average interest rates paid on several types of
household borrowing and lending to banks and other intermediaries, and calibrate on the
basis of these data the interest rate spread at 5.5%. I use the same value for the model
8For example, the rate of non-housing capital depreciation ranges from 1% in Cocco (2005) to 4.3% in
Silos (2007), while the depreciation rate of housing capital ranges from 5.9% in Yang (2009) to 10.9% in
Nakajima (2010).
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Figure 4.2: Age-wealth profiles of the median worker households.
interest rate spread, γ, and have the risk-free interest rate, rd , be determined endogenously.
Furthermore, reasonable values for down payment are between 10 and 20 percent, so I set
λ to be 0.15.
4.10.9 Government policy
The calibration of the set of parameters {ai, j}i=e,w, j=1,2,3 in the tax function on total income
for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs is made by following the results of Cagetti and
De Nardi (2009), who estimate the progressive tax schedule of the U.S. federal income tax
based on PSID data for 1989. The tax rate that captures state and other income taxes, τst ,
is determined endogenously such that the government budget balances in equilibrium. The
labor income tax rate, τss, is also pinned down endogenously such that the social security
contribution paid by workers and entrepreneurs equals the benefits received by the elder.
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Figure 4.3: Age-wealth profiles of the median business households.
The ratio of public expenditure to output is set at 18.7 percent. This was the average ratio
of government purchases to GDP over the 1990-1999 period. The level of government
debt as a fraction of output is calibrated such that in equilibrium total interest payments on
government debt equal 3 percent of output.
4.10.10 The calibrated baseline model
In Table 4.1 I show the model calibrated values of target moments in comparison with their
counterparts. In the baseline model where the nonlinear federal income tax scheme and
the endogenously determined state tax are implemented alone, the share of capital used by
entrepreneurs is 27% (versus 30% in the data); the share of entrepreneurs is 14% (versus
12% in the data); the share of income earned by entrepreneurs is 35% (versus 30% in
the data); the ratio of median wealth of business households to worker households is 8.1
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(versus 8.0 in the data); and the ratio of financial assets to housing asset is 1.5 (versus 1.2
in the data). The values of model moments all fall in the vicinity of their target moments in
data except for the dimension with respect to the fraction of assets owned by entrepreneurs
(30% in model versus 40% in data).
In Figures 4.2 and 4.3 , I compare the age profiles of household asset holdings with
their counterparts in the data by the occupation of household heads. In Figure 4.2, we can
find that there exists a discrepancy between the model and the data in the financial wealth
holdings over the second half of the median worker household’s life cycle. This problem
implies that the current parameter setting may be not in the neighborhood of the optimal
one. A more extensive and refined search in the parameter space would fix the disconfor-
mity. In addition, the mismatch might be attributable to the dichotomous classification of
households by occupation. In the model, there coexist three types of households---the self-
employed, the retired, and wage earners. The last two subgroups of households are pooled
together as the group of work households in the model. In the data, however, subgroups,
like the retired, students, and the unemployed, are dropped in the very beginning of the data
cleaning stage because the model doesn’t account for unemployment and it abstracts from
the occupational status such as students. Consequently, this accounting exercise adopted in
the model might lead to a divergence in the pattern of wealth holdings between the model
and the data, especially over the retirement sage of life cycle. However, the s-shaped age
profile of financial asset position that is featured in the data is still captured by the base-
line model: in the early stage of model life the model financial asset position of the median
worker households is negative, then increasing by age of 45, reaching its lifetime maximum
around the retirement age 65, and declining apparently during the retirement. Besides, the
dual climaxes hit by financial and housing asset holdings in model are shown in tandem
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following the correct order observed in data: the lifetime high hit by financial asset po-
sition shows up much later than that hit by housing asset holdings. The former appears
around age of 65, while the later takes place much earlier in life. In contrast, as shown in
Figure 4.3, the model generated life cycle patterns of asset holdings closely mimic their




At the end of the last chapter, I obtained a calibrated model of the U.S. economy where
the main tax revenues come from a progressive tax on household total income. In the first
policy experiment of this chapter, I introduce a flat capital income tax into the calibrated
model and call the resulting economy as the baseline economy. The amount of government
spending in the stationary equilibrium of the baseline economy is to be computed and
retained in all the policy experiments regardless of the change of tax policies. By doing so,
I execute all the counterfactual tax policy reforms in a revenue-neutral style.
For the expositional convenience, I denote a tax scheme as Tp, where the superscript in-
dicates that this experimental tax scheme is introduced in the tax reform for the p-th policy
experiment. Further, I denote the corresponding economy that ends up with the implemen-
tation of the experimental tax scheme as Ep. For example, I denote the baseline economy
by E1. For expositional convenience, I denote the calibrated model of the US economy by
E0. In the end of this chapter, I will remove model elements like housing or entrepreneurs
one at a time from the basic model environment defined above to conduct derived analysis
from the original one equipped with full model elements, for the purpose of justifying the
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significance of housing and entrepreneurs for matching the wealth distribution generated
by model simulation with that observed in the data.
5.1 Taxes on capital income and wealth
In the first policy experiment, a capital income tax that is imposed on the interest accrued
from savings accounts is introduced into the calibrated model of the US economy, E0. In the
meantime, business profits are still counted toward total taxable income under the nonlinear
total income tax scheme of E0. Note that the taxes other than the nonlinear income tax is
still in effect for equating government revenues to government spending in steady state.
It is also noteworthy that a household’s labor income, social security benefits, and any
lump-sum transfer redistributed by the government are subsumed under household taxable
income. The resulting tax schedule, T1, a modification of the one defined in Section 4.10,
is given by







+ τsvXsv + τstX1, (5.1)
where the subscript 1 indicates that the variable in the formula is used for the economy
E1 where the experimental tax scheme T1 is introduced, and the subscript i indicates the
occupational status of households. The variable, Xsv ≡max[r(a−k),0], denotes the capital
income earned from savings, where a is the level of financial wealth, probably taking nega-
tive value when the household is in debt. X1 stands for taxable incomes under the nonlinear
income tax scheme and is given by:
X1 = Xbp +wẽgēg(1−
τss
2
)1{g<Tr}+b1{g≥Tr}+ trans f er. (5.2)
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The first component in (5.2), Xbp, represents business profits. The tax rate of the last term in
(5.1), τst , captures taxes other than the nonlinear income tax and is pinned down in equilib-
rium. Payroll taxes like social security tax are deductible when computing federal taxable
income, b represents Social Security benefits, and trans f er denotes the lump-sum transfer
evenly distributed by the government from the total wealth left behind by the deceased of
the model. I strictly set the flat rate of taxes on capital income earned from savings, τsv,
to 15% in the economy E1. The number falls in the range of capital income tax rates that
are commonly adopted in the dynamic tax policy literature.1 The equilibrium of the model
economy E1 is solved by adjusting τst to balance the government budget such that govern-
ment expenditures G (the sum of government purchases Gp and government debt services
Gi) is financed by tax revenues collected under the tax schedule T1.
5.1.1 The flat rate wealth taxation
In the second policy experiment, I attempt to evaluate the welfare impact of an extreme
wealth tax scheme, T2, in comparison with the hybrid tax system, T1, which is enacted in
the baseline economy E1. Recall that T1 comprises a proportional capital income tax of
15% and a nonlinear tax scheme on other taxable incomes. The tax reform from T1 to T2
executed is to replace the existing flat-rate capital income tax with taxes on wealth (capital
stock). The rate of the introduced wealth taxation is set revenue-neutrally in the sense that
the tax revenues collected by T2 equals to the level of government expenditure obtained in
the equilibrium of the baseline economy E1.
1In the literature of optimal capital income taxation, authors search for the optimal tax rates on capital
income in the range from 0% to 40%; see Diamond and Viard (2008); İmrohoroğlu (1998); Kitao (2008);
Nakajima (2010) for example. In Nakajima (2010), he fixes the capital income tax at the rate of 40%. Since
the optimal capital income taxation is out of the scope in the current study, for simplicity, I set the flat rate of
taxes on returns from savings to 15% for the tax schemes T1i (Xbp,Xsv,X1) and T
3
i (Xbp,Xsv,X3).
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Holding others unchanged, I set the tax rate of capital income, τsv, to zero, and levy
taxes on wealth at a flat rate of τw. In this alternative economy E2, the tax schedule is
defined by
T2i (Xbp,Xsv,X2) = τw[(a− k)++(1−δh)h+X2], (5.3)
where X2 = X1 +Xsv. The superscript 2 indicates that this tax scheme is implemented in
the economy E2. Note that, relative to the beginning tax scheme in the current policy
experiment, T1, the difference is the consideration of wealth taxation. The corresponding
tax base is expanded to encompass housing stock and financial wealth (h and a), in addition
to incomes from saving Xsv and business profits Xbp. The wealth tax rate is calibrated so
as to generate the same amount of tax revenues as that amassed in the baseline economy
E1. Therefore, tax revenue remains constant between the equilibrium of the beginning
economy E1 and the alternative economy E2 in the tax reform from the tax scheme T1 to
T2.
5.1.2 The progressive wealth taxation
To answer the second main question of this study concerning the welfare effect of the
progressive wealth tax scheme proposed by Piketty (2014), I conduct the third policy ex-
periment as devised below. The alternative tax scheme T3 is an augment of the basic tax
scheme implemented in the calibrated model E0 where only a nonlinear income taxation is
in effect:
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+ 0.01max[W3−$1.3 million,0]1{W3<$6.5 million} (5.4)
where X3 and W3 are, respectively, taxable income and net worth in the end of period, each
of which are defined by:
X3 = Xbp +Xsv +wẽgēg(1−
τss
2
)1{g<Tr}+b1{g≥Tr}+ trans f er (5.5)
W3 = X3 +(a− k)++(1−δh)h. (5.6)
In this policy experiment, the alternative tax base under the nonlinear income tax scheme,
X3, is actually identical to the tax scheme implemented in the baseline economy E1. Like-
wise, the definition of the alternative tax base under the basic version of the Piketty-type
Piketty (2014) progressive wealth tax scheme, W3, is equivalent to that in the economy
E2. In other words, the experimental tax policy to be introduced in the current policy ex-
periment is a hybrid of two extreme cases of taxation—a pure capital income tax scheme
and a pure wealth tax scheme—up to the same consideration of the nonlinear income tax
scheme. To make the outcome of model simulation comparable among policy experiments,
the benchmark economy is chosen to be the baseline economy E1 for all the policy experi-
ments defined so far.
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5.2 Measure of social welfare
After solving the stationary equilibrium in the economies E2 (under T2, a flat wealth tax)
and E3 (under T3, a mix of a capital income tax and a progressive wealth tax), I evaluate the
implied macro effects of respective tax reforms by comparing the aggregate variables and
inequality indices of these two alternative economies with their counterparts in the bench-
mark economy E1. The aggregate variables of interest include output, housing stock, finan-
cial wealth, and net worth. The key measurement of firm dynamics such as the number of
self-employment, employment, productivity, and capital investment are also investigated.
I quantify the welfare losses or gains that result from a tax reform by computing the
consumption equivalent variation (CEV). It measures the constant increment in percentage
of consumption of every household (technically, every combination of state variables) so
that households are indifferent between maintaining the benchmark tax scheme and sup-
porting the alternative tax scheme implied by the tax reform.
The remaining ingredient of my welfare analysis is the social welfare function ranking
different tax schemes. The core question that normally arises in a normative analysis of this
kind is what kind of welfare criterion I take a stand on. I assume that the government wants
to maximize the ex-ante (before talents are realized) expected (with respect to uninsurable
shocks) lifetime utility of a model entrant (i.e., a household whose head is 20 years old)
into a stationary equilibrium implied under the chosen tax scheme. Central to this welfare
is a concern of the policymaker for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and redistribu-
tion among agents of different abilities, as commonly presumed in the literature; see, e.g.,
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). The measurement of the social welfare under the tax
scheme j is defined by:














where ξg denotes the unconditional survival probability of living up to g years. Given the
fact that the household is alive at age g−1, the conditional probability of surviving through
age g is written as ξg/ξg−1. And, c
j
g(·) and h jg(·) are the policy functions of consumption
of nonhousing goods and housing services, and µg is the associated stationary distribution
for age group g.
The welfare gains (or losses) after moving from the benchmark economy Ei to the
alternative economy E j is measured by the uniform percentage increment in nonhousing















Equation (5.8) equates the social welfare in the alternative economy E j (i.e., W j; the left
hand side of the equation) with the adjusted social welfare on basis of the optimal consump-
tion paths in the benchmark economy Ei such that the consumption of non-housing goods
across households is raised by a proportion ε in the benchmark economy Ei (the right hand
side). A negative ε quantifies (5.8) how much the whole households is willing to give up
with respect to optimal consumption under the benchmark tax scheme Ti in order to repeal
the alternative tax policy E j.
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5.3 Results
In this section, I report the simulation outcome of each policy experiment defined in Section
5.1. The pairwise comparisons among the tax schemes (T1, T2, and T3), by comparing the
implied economic performance and the level of social welfare with one another, are docu-
mented. In Subsection 5.3.10, I conduct sensitivity analysis of the calibrated mode when I
use alternative parameters that are linked to the entrepreneurial activities and the existence
of housing asset, as well as policy experiments under alternative parameterizations.
5.3.1 The proportional wealth tax
Recall that one of the taxes levied in the calibrated model of the US economy, E0, is a
nonlinear income tax that mimics the federal income tax enacted in the US. The calibrated
model also consider a flat rate of taxes on household income for balancing the government
budget in equilibrium. Furthermore, the baseline economy E1 accounts for a proportional
rate of taxes on the interest earned from savings in addition to the tax scheme implemented
in the calibrated economy E0. The rate of capital income tax is set strictly to 15%. The
resulting tax scheme of the baseline economy E1 is denoted by T1. The first policy experi-
ment starts with the current subsection 5.3.1.
5.3.2 Macro aggregates
The tax reform analyzed in this subsection is a tax swap from the tax scheme T1 to the
pure wealth tax scheme T2, which considers only a flat wealth tax and imposes it on every
households without any exemptions. For expositional convenience, I denote this tax reform
(or exchangeably, policy experiment) from the initial tax scheme T1 to the alternative tax
scheme T2 by P1. Table 5.1 lists aggregate variables and inequality indices obtained in the
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Table 5.1: Macro aggregates and inequality in E1 and E2: Part I.
Tax policy
Variable T1 T2 % Change
Prices
wages 0.5881 0.5830 -0.87%
interest rates 0.0460 0.0488 6.18%
Aggregate statistics
total output 0.8510 0.8436 -0.87%
corporate sector 0.4308 0.4250 -1.33%
entrepreneurial sector 0.4203 0.4186 -0.40%
housing asset 0.1710 0.1540 -9.90%
financial wealth 0.3267 0.3146 -3.72%
share of business households 0.1081 0.1058 -2.12%
stationary equilibrium of the economies E1 and E2, respectively. The equilibrium prices
move in diverse directions after the tax reform. The wage rate goes down by 0.87%, while
the interest rate increases by 6.18%; see the first section in Table 5.1. The movement of the
interest rate reflects the shrinkage of the underlying capital stock. It is a general equilibrium
effect of the flat wealth tax. The reason behind is simply that the wealth tax targets not only
capital income but also capital stock, which demotivates households to save. It is especially
the case when the returns on savings are smaller than the flat wealth tax. The aggregates
of household housing stock and financial wealth drop by 9.9% and 3.72%, respectively;
see the last two row of the Aggregate statistics section. A secondary effect of the decrease
in capital stock is that total output falls off by 0.87%. It is worth noting that the share of
capital employed in the entrepreneurial sectors remains roughly 50% across the economies
E1 and E2, as observed in the data (see Quadrini, 1999).
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Table 5.2: Income quintiles in E1 and E2.
Quintiles in income distribution
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Tax to income (%)
T1 0.1142 0.1257 0.1460 0.1662 0.2379
T2 0.2657 0.2826 0.2759 0.2014 0.1691
% change 132.71 124.89 88.94 21.20 -28.94
Tax to wealth (%)
T1 0.0515 0.0556 0.0684 0.1161 0.1952
T2 0.1366 0.1366 0.1366 0.1366 0.1366
% change 165.34 145.63 99.86 17.70 -30.00
Total wealth
T1 0.4403 0.6953 1.1953 1.2392 3.0711
T2 0.3540 0.6075 1.1053 1.2591 3.1234
% change -19.60 -12.64 -7.54 1.60 1.70
Fraction of entrepreneurs
T1 0.0026 0.0005 0.0178 0.0045 0.0828
T2 0.0017 0.0005 0.0134 0.0074 0.0828
% change -33.81 -4.67 -24.69 67.13 0.01
5.3.3 Household statistics
In the Household statistics section of Table 5.1, the fraction of entrepreneurs downsizes by
2.12%. Households appear less likely to enter entrepreneurship than they would in E1. One
possible interpretation is that the general equilibrium effect of this tax reform—the effect
which causes the decrease in wages and the increase in the interest rates—makes house-
holds with good entrepreneurial talent take more time to overcome financial constraints
on entering or staying in entrepreneurship. They either accumulate their business capital
slower due to the thinner wage income or face higher costs of external financing because
of the rise of the interest rate. This evidence of this interpretation could be found in the
presence of business households across income quintiles shown in the bottom row of Table
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Table 5.3: Macro aggregates and inequality in E1 and E2: Part II.
Tax policy
Variable T1 T2 % Change
Household statistics
median income of worker households 0.7929 0.7822 -1.35%
wealth of poor 20% worker households 0.3373 0.3269 -3.08%
Gini indices
pre-tax income 48.93 50.11 2.41%
post-tax wealth 41.65 46.23 11.00%
consumption 35.58 40.74 14.50%
5.2. It is obvious the lowest-income quintile is hit severely by the tax reform in the dimen-
sion of entrepreneurship, since the number of entrepreneurs within the quintile decreases
significantly by 33.81%. The loss of entrepreneurs persists across income quintiles except
for the fourth and fifth quintiles. Both of these two high-income quintiles experience an in-
crease in the number of business households. In particular, the head counts of the business
households in the fourth quintile soars by 67% .
Turning back to household statistics in Table 5.3, the median income in worker house-
holds drops by 1.35%. Household wealth facing the poor 20% in the worker household
distribution declines by 3.08%. An explanation for this change in median income is that
labor income accounts for a large share of earnings in worker households. Due to the fall in
wages, the wealth accumulation of worker households under the pure wealth tax scheme T2
is held back by the tax reform from being at the same speed as in the benchmark economy
E1. The rise in the interest rates raise the rate of returns on savings, but it fails to offset the
reduction in household labor income. Thus, the change in median household income turns
out to be negative after the tax reform.
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5.3.4 Inequality
In the bottom section of Table 5.3, I display the measurements of inequality with respect
to three horizons—pre-tax income, post-tax wealth, and consumption. The distribution of
consumption turns out to be the least severe among the three dimensions of interest. The
Gini index of household pre-tax wealth is the highest among the three indicates. Besides,
in Table 5.3 I show that each Gini index considered goes up after the tax reform. The Gini
index of consumption rises from 35.58 to 40.74, or by 14.5%. The Gini indices of post-
tax wealth also adversely increases by 2.41%. These trends imply that the flat rate wealth
taxation worsens the issue of inequality in the benchmark economy.
In Table 5.2, the first section reports the changes in tax burden, measured by the ratio of
tax to income, in each income quintile of the economies E1 and E2. The first four quintiles
face an increase in their tax burden, which ranges from 21.2% up to 132.71%. Conversely,
the fifth (the most income-rich) quintile experiences a reduction of tax relative to incomes
by 28.94%. The worst situation happens to the first (lowest-income) quintile, whose tax
burden surges by more than 130%. Even if we switch the measurement of tax burden to
the ratio of tax to wealth, the similarity of shifts in tax burden can be observed. The first
quintile’s tax burden rises by 165.34%, while the fifth quintile fares even better than when
the measure of inequality is the ratio of tax to income.
The shifts in tax burden can also be justified by the changes in tax payment captured by
the model-generated age profiles of tax payment. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the life cycle
patterns of tax payment made by worker and business households. Shaded area marks the
difference in the amount of tax payment due to the tax switch. For area shaded in blue,
the age groups under the area benefit from the tax reform, while for area shaded in red,
the associated age groups are required to pay more tax than they would in the benchmark
economy. Figure 5.1 shows that nonbusiness households of age 55 or older—including
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Figure 5.1: Age profiles of tax payment in the median worker households in E1 and E2.
senior worker households and households whose head is retired—experience a tax payment
hike.
Why senior worker households and the households whose head is retired (the latter is
grouped into the worker households in the model simulation) are required to make more
wealth tax payment than others? It is because senior households have more housing asset
than financial wealth in their asset portfolio. Such a specific asset composition results from
worker households’ preference in dissaving financial wealth rather than housing asset in the
later stage of lifetime. The mechanism behind this phenomenon is that in the model econ-
omy adjusting the quantity of housing asset is costly, while the model environment doesn’t
assume any costs for trading financial wealth. This model-generated life cycle patterns of
wealth holdings in worker households matches the findings in the empirical exercise: Re-
gardless of how old a worker household head is, the amount of the household’s housing
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Figure 5.2: Age profiles of tax payment in the median business households in E1 and E2.
asset holdings dominates that for financial wealth holdings. The share of housing asset
thus even increases in their retirement, due to their dissaving preference. Since the housing
asset holdings in worker households would otherwise not be taxable under the initial tax
scheme T1, the percentage change in tax payment for these low-income households are
substantially larger after the tax reform.
Due to their dissaving preference, households whose heads are retired or senior workers
need to pay more taxes under the alternative tax scheme T2. Since the proposed life cycle
model by construction features that the retired and senior worker households constitute
the majority of the low-income households, the direction of shifts in tax burden is from
the high-income groups to the low-income groups in the simulation of the current policy
experiment.
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The other question pertaining to the shifts of tax burden is why high-income households
are better off even under an extreme wealth tax scheme that is intended to be in favor
of household with less wealth or low income. First of all, one feature of the proposed
life cycle model is that business households dominate in the high-income groups. It is
because households with entrepreneurial talent have the chance to grasp higher returns from
risky business investment than earn the risk-free returns to savings or exchange their labor
efficiency endowment for wages. Therefore, business households make up the majority
of high-income quintiles. Furthermore, business households make less tax payment in the
alternative economy E2 (see Figure 5.2). Why their tax payment drops? The reason is that
the amount of tax revenue to be collected is predetermined (recall that it is fixed and equals
to the amount of government spending estimated in the calibrated economy, E0) and, in
the meantime, that worker households are required to pay more taxes due to their saving
preference. As a result, business households end up with making less contribution to the
total tax revenue collected in the alternative economy E2.
The alternative economy is poorer in terms of capital stock, less efficient with respect
to production, and observes more inequality in consumption, income and wealth among
households. Although the analysis of inequality stated above mostly focuses on the data of
the consumption distribution, the same interpretation should be readily applied to the other
two dimensions in pre-tax income and post-tax wealth.
5.3.5 The progressive wealth tax
In this subsection, I report the outcome of the policy experiment P2 in evaluating the macro
effects of the Piketty-type (2014) progressive wealth tax defined in Subsection 5.1.2. Recall
that the tax scheme T3 is a hybrid of the nonlinear income tax scheme T0, the flat rate
of capital income tax considered in T1, and the basic version of the progressive wealth
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tax scheme proposed by Piketty (2014). The benchmark economy in the current policy
experiment P2 remains the baseline economy E1. A flat rate of taxes on household taxable
incomes is introduced into the alternative economy E3 to balance the government budget
constraint in stationary equilibrium as I do in the solution of the stationary equilibrium for
the economies E0 and E1.2
Table 5.4: Macro aggregates and inequality in E1 and E3: Part I.
Tax policy
Variable T1 T3 % Change
Prices
wages 0.5881 0.5837 -0.75%
interest rates 0.0460 0.0484 5.27%
Aggregate statistics
total output 0.8510 0.8447 -0.75%
corporate sector 0.4308 0.4259 -1.14%
entrepreneurial sector 0.4203 0.4188 -0.34%
housing asset 0.1710 0.1704 -0.33%
financial wealth 0.3267 0.3163 -3.18%
5.3.6 Macro aggregates
In Table 5.4, I report the changes in macro aggregates and the Gini indices in response to
the tax reform from T1 to T3. The equilibrium prices move in diverse directions as they
do in the policy experiment with a flat wealth tax. The wage rate goes down by 0.75%,
which is smaller than 0.87%, the percentage change of the wage rate in the policy exper-
iment P1. The interest rates rise by 5.27%, which is more moderate than its counterpart
in P1 of 6.18%. Besides, the issue of inefficiency in production and slowdown in wealth
2This strategy is not used in the solution of the economy E2 in which case the endogenously-determined
flat wealth tax rate is pinned down by balancing the government budget condition in stationary equilibrium.
So the solution of E2 needs not to take the flat income tax into consideration for the purpose of balancing the
government budget.
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accumulation observed in P1 is relatively milder in the current case P2. Total output de-
creases by 0.75%, as opposed to its counterpart in P1 of 0.87%. Aggregate financial wealth
falls only by 3.18%, which is slightly improved relative to the corresponding percentage
change, 3.72%, observed in P1. It is worth noting that the improvement on the decrease of
housing asset holdings is stronger than previous aggregate variables. In the current policy
experiment, the reduction of housing stock after the tax reform is only 0.33%, while the
shrinkage of housing stock is nearly as much as 10% in P1. Generally, the progressive tax
scheme T3 outperforms the flat wealth tax scheme T2 but is still inferior to the flat capital
income tax T1, in terms of total output and capital stock.
Table 5.5: Macro aggregates and inequality in E1 and E3: Part II.
Tax policy
Variable T1 T3 % Change
Household statistics
share of business households 0.1081 0.1062 -1.78%
median income of worker households 0.7929 0.7833 -1.21%
wealth of poor 20% worker households 0.3373 0.3348 -0.75%
Gini indices
pre-tax income 48.93 48.88 -0.10%
post-tax income 46.23 46.02 -0.45%
post-tax wealth 41.65 41.58 -0.17%
consumption 35.58 35.6 0.06%
5.3.7 Firm dynamics and household-level statistics
Turing to the statistics at the household level, in Table 5.5, I show that the size of the
business households population shrinks after the tax reform in P2 by 1.78%. In addition,
the median income of worker households declines by 1.21%, and the wealth holdings of
the poor 20% worker households decrease by 0.75%.
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The effect of the progressive wealth tax reform is comparatively milder on firm dynam-
ics, household wealth holdings and inequality as compared with the flat wealth tax reform
in P1. There are more entrepreneurs in the alternative economy E3 after the tax reform
in the current experiment P2. The fraction of business households in the population only
drops by 1.78%, relative to 2.12% in E2 of the policy experiment P1. The median income
of worker households goes down by 1.21%, a negative change which is relatively moderate
as opposed to the falls of worker households’ median income of 1.35% in P1. It is note-
worthy that the wealth of the poor 20% worker households in E3 are affected by the tax
reform much less than they are in E2. The decrease in wealth holdings of the poor 20% of
the worker household is less than 1% relative to the larger negative percentage change of
3.08% observed in E2.
The effects of the progressive wealth tax reform are mixed on the measurements of
inequality with respect to the direction of the changes. In Table 5.5, the Gini indices of
the distributions of pre-tax income and post-tax wealth are improved in the sense that the
index of pre-tax income goes down by 0.1% and that of post-tax wealth declines but in a
slightly stronger manner by 0.75%. On the contrary, the tax reform worsens the inequality
in consumption to some degree. The Gini index of household consumption goes down by
less than 0.1%. When compared with their counterpart in P1, the changes in the Gini in-
dices of interest in P2 move deeper toward the area of less inequality. Overall, to the extent
that the inequality in the distribution of household (pre-tax) income and (post-tax) wealth
are what the policymakers are concerned about and that the moderate rise in consumption
inequality is tolerable by inequality-adverse households, the progressive wealth tax scheme
implemented in E3 is a better tax scheme in terms of inequality alleviation relative to the
capital income tax scheme E1 and the flat wealth tax scheme E2.
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Table 5.6: Income quintiles in E1 and E3.
Quintiles in income distribution
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Tax to income (%)
E1 0.1142 0.1257 0.1460 0.1662 0.2379
E3 0.1094 0.1238 0.1477 0.1670 0.2391
% change -4.18 -1.47 1.14 0.49 0.50
Tax to wealth (%)
E1 0.0515 0.0556 0.0684 0.1161 0.1952
E3 0.0576 0.0452 0.0817 0.1194 0.1956
% change 11.90 -18.76 19.51 2.87 0.20
Total wealth
E1 0.4403 0.6955 1.1949 1.2391 3.0706
E3 0.3845 0.8857 1.0684 1.2010 3.0408
% change -12.67 27.35 -10.58 -3.07 -0.97
Fraction of entrepreneurs
E1 0.0026 0.0005 0.0177 0.0044 0.0828
E3 0.0016 0.0002 0.0160 0.0059 0.0825
% change -40.13 -54.08 -9.75 32.62 -0.39
5.3.8 Shifts in tax burden across income quintiles
In Table 5.6, I display the shifts in tax burden as well as the changes in wealth holdings
across income groups in P2. The first section is pertaining to household tax burden mea-
sured by the ratio of tax to income. The changes in tax burden range from −4.18% for
the lowest-income quintile to 0.5% for the highest-income quintile. There exists a trend of
changes in tax burden, which features a monotonically increasing movement starting from
the first (lowest-income) quintile all the way to the fifth (highest-income) quintile. This
observation shows that the adverse shifts in tax burden in P1, where the low-income house-
holds pay more taxes relative to their income after the flat wealth tax reform. This shift is
absent under the progressive tax scheme T3.
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If we switch the measurement of inequality to the ratio of tax to wealth, the changes are
mixed among the income quintiles, but, by and large, they move in the favorable direction
relative to the tax reform in P1 in the sense that all of the quintiles have a lower tax burden
in P2 relative to their counterparts in P1. The only exception is the fifth quintile whose tax
burden measured by the ratio of tax to wealth is about 0.14% in E2, but roughly 0.2% in
the current alternative economy E3. This observation reflects the fact that the progressive
wealth tax scheme targets the top rich households and let households with less wealth be
exempted from the taxation.
5.3.9 Welfare effects of T2 and T3
In this subsection, I compare the welfare effects of the proportional wealth tax reform P1
with those of the progressive wealth tax reform P2. The measurement of the social welfare
is the ex-ante expected lifetime utility of a new-born household at the beginning of period
one in the stationary equilibrium of an economy of interest.
In Table 5.7, I report changes in social welfare measured in consumption equivalent
terms. I tabulate the CEV of households grouped by age and occupation for the policy
experiments P1 and P2 under the first two columns. Based on the sign and absolute value
of CEV, we can quantitatively understand to which degree a group of households like or
dislike a tax reform. For example, in the flat wealth tax reform P1, the CEV of the first two
youngest age groups are −7.3% and −8.4%, respectively. In this case, the negative sign
of the CEV indicates that the two groups of households are willing to sacrifice a fraction
of their consumption in the benchmark economy E1 in exchange for being rid of the flat
wealth taxation T2. The absolute value of CEV reveals to which degree the households
favor or dislike a tax reform. For example, the youngest age group is willing to sacrifice
7.3% of their consumption in the benchmark economy E1 to reject the implementation of
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Table 5.7: Consumption equivalent variations across age and occupational groups.
% change % change
Class P1 P2 P̃1 P̃2
Age groups
20-25 -7.3 -3.7 -10.7 0.2
25-30 -8.4 -9.1 -6.2 0.0
30-35 -2.1 0.2 -4.2 0.1
35-40 -1.4 -2.7 -6.0 0.1
40-45 -0.1 -1.1 -5.1 0.1
45-50 -1.0 2.5 -0.9 0.1
50-55 -0.8 0.9 -1.5 -0.1
55-60 -3.4 -0.9 -4.9 -0.2
60-65 -7.1 -0.6 -8.1 -0.6
65-70 -12.3 0.8 -13.0 -0.7
70-75 -17.0 2.3 -19.2 -0.4
75-80 -22.5 2.4 -26.7 -0.1
80-85 -26.9 -1.4 -30.5 0.7
85-90 -36.2 -2.0 -33.0 1.2
Household groups
whole -8.99 -2.04 -11.16 0.03
worker -9.96 -2.26 -12.08 0.02
business 7.97 1.54 4.66 0.20
Note: P1 is the tax reform from the initial economy E1 to the alternative economy E2. P2
is the tax reform from the initial economy E1 to the alternative economy E3. For an
economy Ei, the designated tax scheme is denoted by Ti. In the first two column are the
changes in CEV in the tax reforms P1 (1st column) and P2 (2nd column). The third and
fourth columns are left for the same tax reform as in P1 and P2, respectively, except the
absence of housing from the model environment. I denote these two tax reforms with a
tilde on top of the tax reform with which they are associated. For example, P̃1 has the
same setup as P1 except the latter accounting for housing asset.
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the flat wealth tax, while those of ages 40 to 45 are willing to give up merely 0.1% of their
consumption in E1 in exchange for the repeal of the flat wealth taxation.
Looking at the percentage changes in CEV under the first column, we can find a clear
pattern shown in the age profile of CEV in the first section under the P1 column. The
pattern can be roughly divided into three distinct but adjoining periods over the life cycle.
In the first period, which is related to young households of 20 to 45 years old, the age
profile of CEV is trending upward until reaching the maximum at the level of −0.1%,
observed in the age group of 40 to 45 years old. An explanation about this trend is that, in
the model economy, households tend to be in their poorest period of lifetime when they are
young. For this subgroup of the population, they save more in housing asset than financial
wealth for the purpose of building up their collateralizable housing stock to overcome their
financial constraint on business entry. As they are older, they increase their financial wealth
holdings. It is a feature of two-asset life cycle models as demonstrated in Yang (2009),
which finds that borrowing constraints are needed to explain the accumulation of housing
early. Therefore, the younger households are in the model, the more losses in welfare they
have after the flat wealth tax reform because of their preference for holding housing asset.
The second stage is associated with households of 45 to 55 years old. Their CEV is
around −0.9%. After this stage, the age profile of CEV is trending downward. The reason
is that people in the later stage of life, particularly people in the retirement, dissave financial
assets to smooth their consumption. Housing asset holdings remain steady throughout the
later stage of lifetime as shown in the empirical exercise of this study. One of potential
factors for explaining about the slow downsizing of housing later in life is high transaction
costs of housing asset (see Yang, 2009). As a consequence, the proportion of housing asset
in asset portfolio rises, causing households in the retirement age to have larger and larger
welfare losses in the flat wealth tax reform P1 as they age.
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Note that the rationale I made above for explaining the nonlinear life cycle pattern of
welfare gains or losses for the whole population simply relies on the features of the life
cycle pattern of wealth holdings found in worker households, which are just a subgroup
of the whole population. This simplification is justified by the fact that worker households
account for more than 80% of the population. The dominance of worker households makes
them representative of the population of households. Besides, worker households form the
key group that governs the outcome of the policy experiment when the welfare is weighted
by the presence of each subgroup in the population. And it is the case in the current policy
experiment. In Table 5.7, I show that even though the group of business households expe-
rience huge gains in welfare by 7.97%, the economy as a whole faces losses in welfare by
8.99%. This weighted average is more of leaning toward the losses in welfare of −9.96%
experienced by the majority of the population of worker households.
Relative to P1, the public sentiment in terms of CEV toward the progressive wealth tax
reform are not only mixed but also weaker across age groups (see the second column). The
largest sacrifice people are willing to make for deterring the enactment of the progressive
wealth taxation in P2 is a reduction by 9.1% in their consumption in the benchmark econ-
omy E1 in comparison with the maximum losses in welfare by 36.2% in the most senior
age group in P1. There exist six age groups that fare better after the progressive wealth tax
reform P2. For example, the age group of 30 to 35 years old experiences the least welfare
gains of 0.2%, while age groups of 45 to 50 and 70 to 80 years old have welfare gains in the
neighborhood of 2.5%. Conversely, households face losses in welfare universally across all
of the age groups after the proportional wealth tax reform.
As for the impacts on welfare across occupation groups in P2, the economy has less
losses in welfare in the progressive tax reform than it would in the flat wealth tax reform.
Worker households are not beneficiaries like business households in the progressive tax
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reform. However, worker households find the progressive wealth tax reform in P2 less
unpleasant in terms of CEV in comparison with how they feel in the proportional wealth
tax reform. Similarly, business households are less in favor of the progressive wealth tax
reform as opposed to their enthusiasm implied by the absolute value of their positive CEV
in the proportional wealth tax reform.
5.3.10 Models without housing or entrepreneurs
I create two duplicates of the calibrated model of the US economy. In each of these du-
plicates, I remove one of the key elements from the original model environment and then
compute the implied wealth distribution in stationary equilibrium. In one duplicate model,
I remove the housing asset completely so that the resulting model degenerates to a standard
one-asset entrepreneurial model as proposed by Quadrini (2000).
In the other duplicate model, I aim at investigating the importance of stochastic re-
turns on business investments in the proposed two-asset life cycle model to generate the a
fat-tailed wealth distribution. Technically, I keep the role of entrepreneurs in the model en-
vironment but let the mean of the business shocks be only a small fraction of its counterpart
in the calibrated model. By doing so, I create an environment where being a wage earner is
a more rewarding occupational decision, and thus suppress the function of entrepreneurship
in the resulting model. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 graphically demonstrate the performance of the
proposed model in replicating the fat upper tail of wealth distribution observed in the data.
The vertical axis represents the fraction of the households with a specific level of
wealth. The horizontal axis represents the levels of wealth in units of thousands of 2013
dollars. The blue histogram displays the real U.S. household wealth distribution based on
the SCF in 2010. The fraction of rich households decreases slowly. If we look at the upper
CHAPTER 5. THE COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS 85
Figure 5.3: Fat-tailed wealth distribution.
Figure 5.4: Data and model with and without housing and idiosyncratic business shocks.
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part of horizontal axis around the wealth levels between $4 million and $5 million, it is
apparent that there still exists noticeable rich groups clustered in the interval.3
To evaluate the performance of the proposed model and its duplicates in approximating
the fat-tailed wealth distribution, in Figure 5.4 I zoom in on the wealth interval between
$1 million and $4 million to identify the subtle performance in matching the data among
the three models. I find that the model with an unattractive mean of idiosyncratic business
shocks (the line colored in dark green) disappears (i.e., it ends up with touching the axis
and never bouncing back afterward) first approximately at the wealth level of $3.5 million.
It is followed by the model without housing asset (the one marked by a black dashed line)
begins to lose its pace with the trend made by the calibrated model (the line colored in
red) and trending in a weaker manner in the sense that it cannot fully capture the solid
existence of rich groups represented by the blue histogram. The result suggests that the
shocks to business profits and the role of collateralizable housing asset are indispensable
model factors for modeling the thick tail of the empirical wealth distribution.
In Table 5.8, I report the performance of the proposed life cycle model by comparing
the outcome of the policy experiment P1 conducted in the baseline model with that of
the same policy experiments conducted in a duplicate model instead. The baseline model
is fully equipped with model elements defined in Chapter 4 and the duplicate model has
every model factor considered in the baseline model with the exception of one key model
element. To make the simulation outcome of both the models comparable, I make the
parameter setting in the duplicate model the same as it is in the baseline model.4
3I truncate household with wealth worthy of more than $5 million since they are beyond the limits of
figures intended to be shown in the text.
4Recall that I distinguish variables of the duplicate economy from the baseline model by putting a tilde
on top of the notation used in the full model. For example, the policy experiment P̃1 evaluates the effect of
the tax reform from the initial tax scheme T1 to the alternative economy T2 with the duplicate model with the
removal of housing asset. The corresponding initial and alternative economies are, Ẽ1 and Ẽ2, respectively.
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Table 5.8: Macro aggregates and inequality in Ẽ1 and Ẽ2.
Tax policy
T1 T2 % Change
Prices
wages 0.6036 0.5942 -1.56%
interest rates 0.0379 0.0427 12.61%
Aggregate statistics
total output 0.8634 0.8529 -1.21%
corporate sector 0.4966 0.4697 -5.42%
entrepreneurial sector 0.3668 0.3832 4.49%
housing asset - - -
financial wealth 0.3843 0.3529 -8.17%
Household statistics
share of business households 0.0992 0.1005 1.35%
median income of worker households 0.8083 0.7862 -2.74%
wealth of poor 20% worker households 0.3370 0.3220 -4.46%
Gini indices
pre-tax income 49.78 50.92 2.29%
post-tax wealth 42.57 47.17 10.81%
consumption 36.41 41.67 14.45%
Note: The current tax reform (or equivalently, policy experiment) from T1 to T2
is denoted by P̃1. The corresponding initial economy is denoted by Ẽ1 and the
alternative economy by Ẽ2.
The macro aggregates and inequality indices for the policy experiments P̃1 produced
by the duplicate model where housing asset is not included. By contrasting the results of
prediction between the two tables, I find that the percentage change in prices and aggregate
statistics are generally inflated in the duplicate model. For example, the percentage change
in the interest rates is 12.61% in the flat wealth tax reform conducted with the duplicate
model (see Table 5.8), while its counterpart in the baseline model takes the value of 6.18%
in the flat wealth tax reform (see Table 5.1).
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The change in the share of business households in the duplicate model takes a different
sign than its counterpart in the baseline model. The Gini indices either before or after the
tax reform are boosted but the resulting percentage changes caused by the tax reform are
all smaller than their counterparts in the baseline model. For example, the Gini index of
the post-tax wealth is 42.57 in the initial economy of the tax reform and turns to be 47.17
after the tax reform (see Table 5.8). Both the figures are higher than their counterparts
generated by the baseline model, which are 41.65 and 46.23, respectively (see Table 5.3).
The corresponding percentage change of the Gini for the post-tax wealth is smaller in the
duplicate model than in the baseline model. These observations suggest that the use of a
full model with housing asset may generate a totally different prediction than that made
by models with the removal of the housing asset. To the extent that models with richer
environment setting is more likely to provide predictions in line with the reality, a full
model with housing asset could be more favorable than a deficient one.
In the subsequent analysis, I contrast the outcome of policy experiment P2 between
the baseline model and the one-asset duplicate model. The percentage changes in prices
and aggregate statistics are mostly mollified in the duplicate model, although the absolute
values of the associated variables are actually higher than their counterparts in the baseline
model (see Table 5.9 for the outcome of the duplicate model). The financial wealth hold-
ings, for example, drop by 3.18% in the baseline model but fall only two-thirds as much or
by 1.99% in the duplicate model. The absolute levels of pre- and post-tax reform financial
wealth holdings are respectively 0.3843 and 0.3766. Both of them are higher than their
counterparts of 0.3267 and 0.3163 in the baseline model (see Table 5.4 for the baseline
model’s results).
Turning back to Table 5.7, I find obvious differentials between the baseline and dupli-
cate models in the degrees to which households like or dislike a tax reform. For worker
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Table 5.9: Macro aggregates and inequality in Ẽ1 and Ẽ3.
Tax policy
T1 T3 % Change
Prices
wages 0.6036 0.6006 -0.50%
interest rates 0.0379 0.0394 3.96%
Aggregate statistics
total output 0.8634 0.8606 -0.33%
corporate sector 0.4966 0.4902 -1.29%
entrepreneurial sector 0.3668 0.3703 0.98%
housing asset - - 0.00%
financial wealth 0.3843 0.3766 -1.99%
Household statistics
share of business households 0.0992 0.0992 -0.01%
median income of worker households 0.8083 0.8069 -0.18%
wealth of poor 20% worker households 0.3370 0.3357 -0.37%
Gini indices
pre-tax income 49.78 49.74 -0.08%
post-tax wealth 42.57 42.19 -0.89%
consumption 36.41 36.42 0.03%
Note: The current tax reform (or equivalently, policy experiment) from T1 to T3
is denoted by P̃2. The corresponding initial economy is denoted by Ẽ1 and the
alternative economy by Ẽ3.
households (or the whole population), the negative welfare impacts of the proportional
wealth tax reform P̃1 conducted in the duplicate (one-asset) model are generally larger
than that of the same tax reform (under a different notation, P1) conducted in the base-
line (two-asset) model. In contrast, business households are less well off after the flat
wealth tax reform described in the duplicate model than they would during the same tax
reform simulated by the baseline model. For example, worker households in the duplicate
model face larger losses in welfare by 12.08% than 9.96% observed in the simulation out-
come produced by the baseline model (see the row titled “worker” under the first and third
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columns). In comparison, for the flat wealth tax, business households experience fewer
welfare gains by only 4.66% in the duplicate model than 7.97% in the baseline model.
In addition to the inconsistency in the extent of changes in CEV after the flat wealth tax
reform, inconsistency in the direction of changes is observed after the progressive wealth
tax reform between the baseline and duplicate models. For example, worker households
suffer losses in welfare by 2.26%, which is suggestive of their dissatisfaction about the
introduction of the progressive wealth tax scheme. Conversely, they turn to be beneficiaries
in the progressive wealth tax reform in the duplicate model because they receive gains in
welfare by 0.02%. Due to the fact that the CEV on the aggregate level is a weighted average
by the size of subpopulations and that worker households constitute the biggest subgroup
of the whole population, the economy is worse off after the progressive wealth tax reform
in the baseline model (see the row titled by “whole” under the second column), but is
obviously better off in the duplicate model (see the same row under the fourth columns).
The analysis in this subsection suggests that the concerns about the tradeoff between
the model richness and the computational complexity is not trivial in the quantitative liter-
ature. In the current case, a deficient model with the removal of housing may reverse the
conclusion made with a richer model. To the extent that a richer model is equipped with
higher degree of modeling freedom to approach the reality better, the use of a deficient




In this study, I investigate three central questions. Are the life-cycle saving behaviors of en-
trepreneurial households and wage earner households different? Can life-cycle patterns of
wealth holdings in business households be produced by a life-cycle entrepreneurial model?
Is wealth taxation a preferred tax policy when compared to capital income taxation?
First, I assess the life-cycle wealth holdings of business oriented (entrepreneurial house-
holds) in contrast to that of wage earning (non-entrepreneurial households). To do so, I
statistically characterize the life-cycle wealth holding patterns of households particularly
by occupational category, based on the pseudo panel data set compiled from the cross-
sectional data of the Survey of Consumer Finances. I conclude that the pattern of wealth
holding over the life cycle in entrepreneurial households are distinct from that in non-
entrepreneurial households. In the median wage earner household, the age profile of finan-
cial asset holding is S-shaped and that of housing stock is hump-shaped but exhibiting a
flattening out pattern in the second half of lifetime. In comparison, regardless of whether
the asset type is housing or financial wealth, asset holding in the median business house-
hold grows steadily over the life cycle. The lifetime maximum of housing stock held by the
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non-entrepreneurial households is at most half as much as that held by the entrepreneurial
households. The maximum of non-housing assets possessed by non-entrepreneurial house-
holds is only one thirtieth as much as that (including business equity) by entrepreneurial
households.
To help explain this pattern of asset holding over the life cycle of households, I develop
a quantitative and realistically calibrated dynamic general-equilibrium model of optimal
housing and financial wealth holding decisions for finitely lived households. Households
are heterogeneous in multiple dimensions including occupational status and entrepreneurial
ability. Households face several market frictions including the absence of insurance mar-
kets to ensure against shocks to labor- and business-income. I fit the model to the U.S. data
and show that it replicates the empirical life-cycle patterns of wealth holding for the U.S.
households in the two occupation subgroups of the population.1
The flattening out pattern of housing assets is likely due to friction in trading houses.
The high transaction costs of housing trade dis-incentivizes senior non-entrepreneurial
households from decreasing their housing stock as fast as their financial wealth holding.
On the contrary, because of the existence of borrowing constraints and the role of hous-
ing as security, young non-entrepreneurial households—who start with only a handful of
wealth endowment—borrow as much as possible to buy houses for the purpose of con-
sumption as well as making collateral loans for running businesses to earn higher returns
on capital.
This study is not the first that recognizes the features of the life-cycle pattern of wealth
holdings for average U.S. households in the data and replicates these features with a quan-
titative model (See Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2011 and Yang, 2009 for similar
findings). However, this study is the first to documents the age profile of wealth holdings
1The only exception is that the simulated life-cycle financial asset holding of non-entrepreneurial house-
holds doesn’t follow as closely the pattern observed in the data.
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for the median entrepreneurial household. Further, it pioneers the reproduction of these
features with the calibrated model of the U.S. economy. In the empirical exercise, I find
that there exists sustained growth of housing stock and financial wealth holding throughout
the lifetime of entrepreneurial households. The intersection of the age profiles of housing
asset and financial wealth holdings takes place much earlier in the life of entrepreneurial
households as opposed to the case for non-entrepreneurial households. The borrowing
for building up the housing stock early in life, as found in the age profile of housing asset
holding of non-entrepreneurial households, is not seen in the case of entrepreneurial house-
holds. Although entrepreneurial households are subject to the same market frictions like
borrowing constraints, the higher rate of returns on business investment help entrepreneurs
accumulates wealth fast enough for themselves to be free earlier in life from the reliance
on collateral borrowing for smoothing consumption or the last resort to catch investment
opportunities. This interpretation may be indirectly justified by the empirical finding in this
study that entrepreneurs have less outstanding debts as they age. Similarly, the transaction
costs of adjusting the quantity of housing stock is dwarfed by the benefits derived from
the growth in the size of asset portfolio propelled by the higher rate of returns on business
investment. As a result, the flattening out pattern of housing asset holding that occurs in
the later stage of life is not observed in entrepreneurial households.
To answer the third central question about whether wealth taxation is a favorable tax
policy as opposed to capital income taxation, I use a realistically calibrated version of the
proposed model to examine the welfare and distributional effects of the progressive wealth
tax scheme proposed by Thomas Piketty (2014). I conclude that in terms of efficiency in
production, the proportional capital income tax scheme, T1, gives rise to the highest total
output among the three tax schemes, T1, T2, and T3 . Conversely, in terms of distributional
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effect measured by shifts in tax burden, the progressive wealth tax scheme, T3, outper-
forms the other two tax scheme, T1 and T2. It shifts the tax burden from low-income to
high-income households. However, the low-income households are worse off because the
tax reform induces unfavorable changes in equilibrium prices as well as the surge in tax
payments due to their unique preference in asset composition. Wage earning households
face losses in labor income, which retard their wealth accumulation, causing them to miss
opportunities to enter entrepreneurship due to the lack of business capital. In comparison,
entrepreneurial households, especially those who are not financially constrained or borrow
against collateralizable housing asset, benefit from cheaper rental prices of labor input and
receive higher business income than they would otherwise.
The progressive wealth tax does not widen the income and savings gap between en-
trepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial households. The Gini indices in the three dimensions
of interest all decrease slightly except for the Gini index of consumption. Despite the pos-
itive, but almost indiscernible, effects on reducing the Gini indices of pre-tax income and
post-tax wealth, the tax reform is not likely to be favored by the majority of the population
because of the prevailing welfare costs for the non-entrepreneurial households measured in
consumption equivalent terms.
The benchmark economy implements a 15% flat-rate capital income tax. The policy
suggestion may vary because of the change in government spending resulting from a dif-
ferent rate of the capital income tax in the benchmark economy. A broader inspection with
a range of rates of capital income taxes other than 15% about the impacts of reestablishing
fiscal balance after a tax reform would be interesting and is left for future research.
It should be noted that the calibrated model of the U.S. economy has not been subjected
to any sensitivity analysis. An extension of the current work is to test the robustness of the
model by introducing reasonable disturbances into the calibrated model’s parameter setting.
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It should be also noted that there might be features of reality that could provide additional
reasons to support the enactment of a progressive wealth tax scheme. For example, my
model only considers accidental bequests, in which case the government is assumed to
levy on the inheritance from the deceased at a rate of 100% and then redistributes the
collection evenly to people alive in the next period. A more realistic but technically more
challenging setup is to introduce intergenerational transmission within families into the
model to account for the differentials in the accumulation of wealth between high- and
low-wealth households. This extra heterogeneity is expected to raise the degree of wealth
concentration and probably reverse the conclusion of this study, casting the progressive
wealth tax reform P2 in a more favorable light.
There exists room for further improvement with respect to the calibration of the pro-
posed model to match the data. Ideally, we want to have a set of data targets, each of which
is sensitive to the change of a particular parameter exclusively. In practice, there seldom
exists a clear-cut one-to-one mapping between the parameters to be calibrated and the data
targets. In the current model, the transaction costs and the collateral-borrowing function of
housing asset play an important role in inducing the early-life saving and late-life dissaving
differentials across households. However, none of the data targets is directly related to the
housing-preference parameter, θ , except the ratio of total financial assets to total housing
stock, which is used to calibrate β instead. Why don’t I consider a more suitable data target
to replace the current data target for θ , i.e., the total wealth held by business households?
It is because I want to retain useful macro statistics that could help the model better charac-
terize the business household’s behavior, and in the meantime, I need to keep the size of the
parameter space under control in exchange for the computational feasibility in performing
the global optimization techniques for calibration. A refined but time-consuming calibra-
tion would be to enlarge the parameter space by adding one more dimension to include a
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parameter that is currently set up by referring to a well-adopted value in the literature. Then
let the information of aggregate housing asset be separated from the data target for β so
as to be explicitly left for calibrating the value of θ . Besides, I could also take the infor-
mation about inequality indices into consideration when I calibrate the proposed model to
match the U.S. economy. This would be a rewarding extension of the current work but also
increases the computational burden in performing model calibration in a much higher di-
mensional parameter space. I leave this expansion for future research when more powerful
computers and advanced algorithms are available.
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İmrohoroğlu, S. 1998. “A Quantitative Analysis of Capital Income Taxation.” International
Economic Review, pp. 307–328.
Jappelli, T., and F. Modigliani. 1998. The Age-Saving Profile and the Life-Cycle Hypothe-
sis.
Jensen, T.L., S. Leth-Petersen, and R. Nanda. 2014. “Housing Collateral, Credit Constraints
and Entrepreneurship - Evidence from a Mortgage Reform.” Working paper No. 20583,
National bureau of economic research.
Kitao, S. 2008. “Entrepreneurship, Taxation and Capital Investment.” Review of Economic
Dynamics 11:44–69.
Lindquist, M.J., J. Sol, and M. Van Praag. 2015. “Why Do Entrepreneurial Parents Have
Entrepreneurial Children?” Journal of Labor Economics 33:269–296.
Lucas, R.E. 1978. “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms.” The Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, pp. 508–523.
Meh, C.A. 2005. “Entrepreneurship, Wealth Inequality, and Taxation.” Review of Economic
Dynamics 8:688–719.
Mehra, R., and E.C. Prescott. 1985. “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle.” Journal of Monetary
Economics 15:145–161.
Modigliani, F. 1986. “Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations.” American
Economic Review 76:297–313.
Nakajima, M. 2010. “Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Housing.” Working paper,
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Ocampo, S., G. Kambourov, D. Chen, B. Kuruscu, and F. Guvenen. 2017. “Use It or Lose It:
Efficiency Gains from Wealth Taxation.” Working paper No. 913, Society for Economic
Dynamics.
Piketty, T. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press.
Quadrini, V. 2000. “Entrepreneurship, Saving, and Social Mobility.” Review of Economic
Dynamics 3:1–40.
—. 1999. “The Importance of Entrepreneurship for Wealth Concentration and Mobility.”
Review of income and Wealth 45:1–19.
Quadrini, V., and J.V. Ríos-Rull. 1997. “Understanding the Us Distribution of Wealth.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Quarterly Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis 21:22–36.
101
Robinson, P.M. 1988. “Root-N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression.” Econometrica
56:931.
Saez, E., and G. Zucman. 2016. “Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
131:519–578.
Schmalz, M.C., D.A. Sraer, and D. Thesmar. 2017. “Housing Collateral and Entrepreneur-
ship.” The Journal of Finance 72:99–132.
Silos, P. 2007. “Housing, Portfolio Choice and the Macroeconomy.” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 31:2774–2801.
Social Security Administration. 2007. “Annual Statistical Supplement, 2006, to the Social
Security Bulletin.” Social Security Administration, Washington, DC., p. 515.
Speckman, P. 1988. “Kernel Smoothing in Partial Linear Models.” J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. B
50:413–436.
Stiglitz, J.E. 2015. “The Origins of Inequality, and Policies to Contain It.” National Tax
Journal 68:425–448.
Tauchen, G. 1986. “Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate and Vector
Autoregressions.” Economics letters 20:177–181.
Vereshchagina, G., and H.A. Hopenhayn. 2009. “Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs.” The
American Economic Review 99:1808–1830.
Wolff, E.N. 2016. “Deconstructing Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1983-
2013.” Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Wunder, C., A. Wiencierz, J. Schwarze, and H. Küchenhoff. 2011. “Well-Being Over the
Life Span: Semiparametric Evidence from British and German Longitudinal Data.” The
Review of Economics and Statistics 95:154–167.
Yang, F. 2009. “Consumption Over the Life Cycle: How Different Is Housing?” Review of
Economic Dynamics 12:423–443.
Zimmerman, D.J. 1992. “Regression Toward Mediocrity in Economic Stature.” The Amer-
ican Economic Review, pp. 409–429.
Appendix A
Estimation of the partially linear model
The estimation procedure consists of three steps. Let y be the vector of housing asset
holdings in the synthetic cohort panel data, be the dependent variable of the partially linear
regression analysis, and let X be the design matrix for the cohort and time dummies. First,
compute the smoother matrix S of kernel regression such that ŷit = m̂(ageit) and ŷ = Sy,
where ŷ is the vector of the fitted values related to y. Then, to prepare for disentangling
the effect of age, compute the partial residual vector r̃ ≡ (I− S)y, where I is the identity
matrix and the adjusted design matrix is X̃ defined as (I−S)X . The second step is to apply
the least squares method to estimate the coefficients of the linear part of the partially linear
regression model. The estimate of the coefficients of the linear regression model r̃ = b̂′X̃
is given by b̂ = (X̃ ′X̃)−1X̃ ′r̃. The final step is to estimate the function m(ageit) using the
Nadaraya-Watson estimator, taking as the dependent variable y−Xb̂.
Figure A.1 on page 105 display the financial wealth holding of the median worker
households. The trend that looks smoother (colored in red) is the age profile estimated
by the partially linear regression model defined in chapter 3. The zigzag line (colored
in blue) represents the age profile confounded by cohort and survey-year effects and is
formed directly by connecting data points in the SCF pseudo panel data in 1983-2013.
It is apparent that the smoothed age profile is S-shaped. The estimated age profile doesn’t
follow the major trend of the zigzag line. The digression implies that the cohort and survey-
year effects dominates the age effect on the life-cycle pattern of household financial wealth
holding.
Figure A.2 shows the age profile of the housing equity held by the median worker
households. The smoothed age profile reaches a plateau in early 40s. This empirical finding
is in line with the observation in Yang (2009), whose pseudo panel data are compiled from
the same SCF survey data except that her analysis covers less surveys.
Figure A.3 on page 106 displays the age profile of financial wealth holding of the me-
dian business households. The dissaving behavior of business households is hardly ob-
served in the smoothed age profile of financial wealth holding. The negative financial
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wealth holding observed in the early 40s of the median worker households is missing in the
business household’s age profile of financial wealth holdings. Instead the latter not only has
turned positive in the early stage of lifetime and grows steadily even after the retirement
age of 65.
Figure A.4 plots the age profile of housing asset holding of the median business house-
holds. The median business households’ housing equity holdings grow in a milder pace
relative to their financial wealth holdings. However, relative to its counterpart for worker
households, the level of the median business households’ home equity holding is larger
roughly by a factor of 10.
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Table A.1: The linear part of partially linear regression results.
yit = constant +∑βicohorti +∑βtyeart +m(ageit)+ εit , (A.1)
where yit is the level of a specific statistic of household asset holdings for cohort i in the
survey of year t, the variable cohorti is a dummy for each cohort i except the oldest one,
yeart is a dummy for each survey year t , m(ageit) = E(yit |ageit) is a nonlinear smoothing
function of ageit , where ageit denotes the age of cohort i in the survey year t, {β j} are
parameters for cohort ( j = i) and time ( j = t) effects, respectively, and εit is an
independent, zero mean, random error.
Worker households Business households
Variable housing asset financial wealth housing asset financial wealth
Cohort dummy
1956 12384.09 9496.19 68683.23 68297.50
1951 23418.31 12654.22 42393.54 17670.54
1946 43055.27 32740.74 55160.07 99781.36
1941 36089.87 37484.45 39021.99 96393.74
1936 35304.66 37511.58 23212.00 33351.04
1931 34058.23 47007.68 -11047.32 51557.42
1926 20780.45 57507.69 -51518.11 -302314.43
1921 24239.70 48923.93 17498.11 165224.86
1916 42638.33 73524.67 -111013.94 -234880.87
1911 2095.29 42226.36 -48729.11 -343840.17
Year dummy
1983 -67723.89 -35952.96 -66804.65 -9283.93
1986 68266.78 36216.04 67478.89 9821.38
1989 10282.00 -1411.06 -1802.13 150381.11
1992 -15525.82 -5703.87 8285.84 -35408.10
1995 -6792.20 -8347.32 -30965.82 -135540.83
1998 666.86 9012.97 2289.62 -196409.82
2001 -2392.32 21965.80 -9276.14 91278.60
2004 31973.87 4137.39 46018.49 125023.23
2007 27359.02 -1357.84 50918.60 51311.76
2010 -14388.91 -7739.75 -11288.59 1741.21
2013 -31725.40 -10819.39 -54854.10 -52914.60
Entries are partially linear regression coefficients.
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Figure A.1: Median worker household financial assets holding.
Figure A.2: Median worker household housing asset holding.
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Figure A.3: Median business household financial assets holding.
Figure A.4: Median business household housing asset holding.
Appendix B
Computational procedure
I construct a two-dimensional grid for approximating the decisions with respect to the two
continuous state variables, housing and non-housing assets, with discrete levels. The max-
imum asset level is chosen such that, in the stationary equilibrium, the measure of agents
with the asset level is zero. The lower bound is chosen as the maximum amount that an
agent can ever borrow. The grid is not evenly spaced in the way that the distance between
adjacent points are finer at lower levels of assets and coarser at higher levels. The procedure
is parsed into the following steps:
1. Given all parameter values, the procedure begins with guessing the equilibrium inter-
est rate rd (and wage rate w), and the proportional income tax rate, τst . Taking these
as given, solve for the policy functions of housing stock, financial asset holding, and
business investment, {ga(·),gh(·),gk(·)}, across 14 periods of a life cycle.
2. Construct the transition matrix M based on the policy functions {ga(·),gh(·),gk(·)}
and transition probabilities of {k,z,y}. Then compute the associated invariant dis-
tribution over all the combinations of states and periods of time, starting with a





for later periods, g = 1, . . . ,T − 1, where the superscript [n] indicates the variable
being loaded/computed in the n-th round of iteration. Update the distribution of new
entrants according to bequest distribution and intergenerational transition of labor
productivity to get new distribution of model entrants µ [2]1 .
3. Repeat the proceeding step until the difference between µ [n+1]g and µ
[n]
g for each g is
smaller than a given convergence criterion, i.e., the distribution is invariant.
4. Check to see whether the government budget balances. If it doesn’t, update τst and
repeat steps 2–4 until the government budget balance condition is satisfied.
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5. Given the obtained invariant distribution {µ [n+1]g }Tg=1, compute total wealth in the
economy, and total capital invested as well as total labor demanded in the en-
trepreneurial sector. Compute labor and capital employed in the corporate sector.
Check to see if implied interest rate r[n+1]d is in the neighborhood of r
[n]
d . If it does,
stop the computational procedure. Otherwise, update all the prices and the propor-
tional income tax rate τss with the secant method. Repeat steps 1–5 until rd con-
verges.
